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Abstract
Improving principal quality in Arkansas may be a partial solution to the public policy
problem of low performing public schools. Just as policymakers in other states are beginning to
explore incentive-based compensation policies to improve principal quality, education
policymakers in Arkansas should look to these policies as a way to align goals and minimize
agency costs. Setting incentives tied to transparent, publicly available performance measures can
resolve monitoring difficulties inherent in principal-agent relationships and can improve goal
congruence by signaling clearly about policy priorities. Before plowing forward with
performance pay reforms for school principals, Arkansas policymakers could make better
decisions in light of research about the Arkansas principal labor market. Specifically,
understanding whether more effective principals earn larger salaries or get higher increases in
pay can inform policymakers about the incentives that currently exist in the principal labor
market and can guide their policy reform decisions about how to improve principal quality.
The original research in this study indicates that principals in Arkansas are not
meaningfully rewarded for superior performance, either through explicit performance bonuses or
though earning higher salaries by being hired in better paying principalships. Variation in
principal pay is driven by the district and school enrollment, the amount of wealth in a district, a
principal’s experience, and a principal’s degree level. If policymakers would like to focus
principal attention on performance, rather than encouraging them simply to earn higher degrees
or to seek employment in large, wealthy districts, policymakers should consider instituting
performance-based pay.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Introduction
An essential feature of the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act in 2001 – the landmark federal education policy commonly known as No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) – was the stated focus on teacher quality as a critical
component for improving public education (Darling-Hammond and Sykes, 2003; U.S
Department of Education , 2003). NCLB’s accountability system, focusing on
standardized testing and the threat of sanctions for poor performance, included a
requirement that participating states design a policy for ensuring that all students were
being taught by a Highly Qualified Teacher (HQT) by the end of the 2005-06 school year
(U.S. Department of Education , 2003).
Just as NCLB has focused attention on the importance of providing each student
with a highly qualified teacher, educational policymakers at the national, state, and local
levels are now beginning to turn their attention to school principal quality. At a hearing of
the House Education and Labor Committee in May 2007, witnesses testified before
Congress that initiatives to improve principal quality should be central to reauthorization
of NCLB (Office of George Miller, 2007). Education reformers and legislators are
choosing to focus on improving the quality of human resources because of the mounting
evidence that good principals can (Marzano et al., 2005; Brewer, 1993; Hallinger and
Heck, 1998; Nettles and Herrington, 2007) and good teachers (Hanushek and Rivkin,
2004; Sanders and Rivers, 1996, Darling-Hammond, 2000; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain,
2005) do make a difference for student achievement (Office of George Miller, 2007).

Education reforms to address low student achievement can be categorized
generally into four categories: (a) those which focus on governance reforms, such as
charter schools, (b) those which seek to drive improvement by creating higher standards
through standards and testing, (c) those aimed at improving curriculum, and (d) those
which focus on human capital improvements. A school’s key human resources include
teachers and principals. Because principals can impact educational outcomes, either
directly (Marzano et al., 2005) or indirectly (Brewer, 1993; Hallinger and Heck, 1998;
Nettles and Herrington, 2007), some policymakers believe that improving principal
quality will lead to better student achievement. To improve student achievement by
raising principal quality, policymakers consider the policy levers available that can
impact features of the existing principal labor market.
Some local and state policymakers across the nation have already begun to
experiment voluntarily with new solutions to the problem of low student academic
performance by focusing their attention on school principal quality (Goldhaber, 2007).
As examples of this growing trend, I describe below several state initiatives in Texas and
two local initiatives – New York City school district’s principal evaluation program and
the Pittsburgh PULSE program.
According to Lewis and Springer (2008), pay-for-performance plans have been a
part of the Texas public education landscape since the 1980’s. In the last three years, in
addition to having nine districts participating in federally funded performance pay
programs through the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), Texas has implemented three statefunded incentive pay programs for educators as a part of the Governor’s Educator
Excellence Award Program (GEEAP) – the Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant
2

(GEEG), the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG), and District Awards for Teacher
Excellence (DATE) (U.S. Department of Education, 2008; Terry, 2008; Lewis and
Springer, 2008). GEEG and TEEG are targeted at high poverty, high performing districts
(Terry, 2008). The DATE grants, though they provide recipient districts with some
flexibility, stipulate that districts must use a certain portion for teacher awards tied
directly to student performance and a certain portion for other incentives, including
principal incentives (Terry, 2008). Not all of these programs focus primarily on principal
performance, but many of them provide rewards for principals based on the student
achievement of their students.
In the Austin Independent School District, for example, principals can earn up to
$8,000 in bonuses depending on the magnitude of student growth in reading and math on
Texas state achievement tests (Terry, 2008). Dallas Independent School District (DISD)
has been providing pay incentives for principals as a part of the district’s school
performance awards program since 1992 (Ladd, 1999, Terry, 2008). Although DISD
stopped using that program in 2007-08, it recently instituted a new performance pay plan
that includes bonuses of up to $10,000 for principals (Terry, 2008). In addition to
receiving state funds through GEEG and TEEG (Terry, 2008), this new DISD plan is also
federally-funded through a TIF grant (U.S. Department of Education, 2008). As
Goldhaber (2007) and Terry (2008) note, Houston Independent School District (HISD)
also has a performance pay plan that includes financial rewards for principals. Having
evolved from the merit pay plans HISD has used over the last decade (Terry, 2008),
HISD’s current incentive pay plan is funded by TIF money, foundation support, and state
grants, and district principals can earn up to $12,000 for superior performance (Houston
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Independent School District, 2007). Local incentive pay programs are also emerging
across the country as well.
In January 2008, New York City public schools administration announced
reforms to improve the selection and evaluation of principals (Gootman, 2008). The new
selection process would involve centralized screening of applicants. The new evaluation
system would incorporate a 0-4 rating scale based on detailed criteria, including student
test scores. With biannual ratings, this new system would replace the existing annual
rating system of principals that had a satisfactory-unsatisfactory grading scale (Gootman,
2008). Similarly, Pittsburgh Public Schools have begun to reform training, evaluation,
and accountability systems of the district’s principals.
Just as in New York, principals in Pittsburgh have traditionally been rated on a
satisfactory-unsatisfactory scale and have been compensated primarily based on
experience. With the initiation of the Pittsburgh Urban Leadership System for Excellence
(PULSE) program in the 2007-08 school year, principals are now evaluated and
compensated based on their performance (Pittsburgh Public Schools, 2008). Through the
program’s pay-for-performance component, principals can earn a $2,000 raise as a part of
their salary for earning proficient ratings across the evaluation rubric (Pittsburgh Public
Schools, 2008; Goldhaber, 2007). They can also earn up to $10,000 as a bonus for
improvements in student achievement, measured in part by performance on standardized
tests (Pittsburgh Public Schools, 2008; Goldhaber, 2007).
As is evident in the state and local principal evaluation and compensation reform
efforts described above, policymakers are looking at new ways to select, evaluate, and
compensate principals to assure that students can benefit from the learning communities
4

produced by high quality school leaders. When policymakers attempt to provide
incentives to motivate behavioral changes by principals and teachers regarding their
career choices, policymakers are using levers that can change the public education labor
market. Unfortunately, policymakers are often operating without a comprehensive
understanding of the principal labor market. Indeed, as Goldhaber (2007) notes, little
research on school principal compensation has been performed either at a general
descriptive level or at a detailed analytical level. It is safe to say that the efforts of
policymakers to institute incentive-based reforms designed to improve principal quality
would benefit from a broader understanding of the existing principal labor market.
These incentive-pay policy proposals rely on assumptions informed by principalagent theory and on research regarding teacher performance pay plans. Before plowing
forward with performance pay reforms for school principals, Arkansas policymakers
could perhaps make better decisions in light of research about the Arkansas principal
labor market. Moreover, the applicability of principal-agent theory to this educational
context must be analyzed. Additionally, potential differences between the principal and
teacher labor markets may in fact render such policy solutions unnecessary. Namely, a
performance pay system for principals may already be in place. In other words, there may
be variation in principal pay in different school settings statewide, and highly effective
principals may already be sorting themselves into better paying jobs. This study is
intended to inform policymakers about the existing features of the school principal labor
market in Arkansas and about the merits of policy proposals that include principal
performance pay. Further, this study will add to the scholarly literature on incentive-
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based compensation policies to improve student achievement through better educational
leadership.
Statement of the Problem
Improving principal quality in Arkansas may be a partial solution to the public
policy problem of low performing public schools. Arkansas K-12 student achievement is
relatively low both in comparison to other states and in absolute terms. Performance data
in Table 1.1 from the National Assessment of Education Progress, NAEP, reveal that the
academic achievement of K-12 students in Arkansas lags behind the rest of the nation.
Arkansas students ranked 31st out of 51 in 2007 on the Grade 4 Math Exam and 36th out
of 51 on the Grade 4 Reading Exam. On the Grade 8 Math and Reading Exams, Arkansas
students fared even worse. They ranked 42nd out of 51 on Grade 8 Reading and 40th on
Grade 8 Math.

Table 1.1: Arkansas Performance in Average Scale Scores on 2007 National Assessment
of Education Progress Compared to Other States (Including DC)

Ranking out of 51
Arkansas
National Average

Grade 4
Math
31st
238
239

Grade 4
Reading
36th
217
220

Grade 8
Math
42nd
274
280

Grade 8
Reading
40th
258
261

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education
Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 2007 Mathematics Assessment.
NOTE: The NAEP Mathematics scale ranges from 0 to 500. Observed differences are not necessarily
statistically significant.

In absolute terms, this low relative performance ultimately results in an extremely
high college remediation rate. According to the 2007 Arkansas School Performance
Report issued annually by the National Office for Research on Measurement and
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Evaluation Systems at the University of Arkansas, the college remediation rate in 2007
was 48.1 percent (Arkansas State Report Card, 2007). This figure means that
approximately 50 percent of students who have taken the ACT would need to take a
remedial college course in Mathematics, English, or both subjects (Remediation Rate,
2008).
Rationale for the Study
This study is designed as a guide Arkansas state policymakers who are
considering improvements in educational leadership at the school level as strategy for
raising student achievement in the state. Very little research has been conducted on the
features of the school principal labor market. At the conclusion of a recent study on
principal compensation, teacher and principal compensation expert Dan Goldhaber
(2007) noted:
… outside of a few high-profile examples, we have virtually no systemic
knowledge about the structure of principal compensation including the
extent to which compensation is linked to specific principal credentials or
characteristics, or covered by collective bargaining agreements; whether
principals are financially rewarded for taking tough leadership
assignments; and whether there is a link between their compensation and
measures of their performance. It should come as no surprise that a
researcher is recommending more research on a topic, but, in this case, the
need is profound. (p. 15)

Indeed, there is a dearth of research on the school principal labor market, and
policymakers in Arkansas would benefit from a comprehensive understanding of the
characteristics of this sector before proposing substantive changes.
For this reason, this study includes a broad exploration of the topic, including
explanation of the barriers to entry into the profession that are designed to ensure
7

principal quality. For example, I discuss educational and experience prerequisites that
impact the supply of principals. I also consider current monitoring, or evaluation,
practices that are intended to reinforce high standards for educational leadership
performance. Alongside this discussion about policies and practices that influence school
principal quality, I present descriptive statistics about features of the workforce that has
resulted from these policies. I also investigate the factors that impact both changes in the
level of principal pay and the rate of increase in principal pay.
Before designing policy solutions to ameliorate potential educational inadequacies
related to leadership, policymakers need a clear understanding of the principal pay and
quality landscape and the nature of any patterns of principal sorting. For example,
policymakers should understand if, in fact, low-income or low-performing students are
routinely served by low quality principals before offering monetary incentives that can
motivate higher quality principals to choose to work in such settings. Specifically, this
study will reveal the sorting patterns of principals with varying characteristics and
whether high-performing principals are already being rewarded for meeting student
achievement standards. With this information about the incentives inherent in the current
principal labor market, policymakers can better evaluate policies that propose to modify
how principals are evaluated and paid.
Outline of the Study
In Chapter One, I establish the relevance of investigating principal quality reform
policies given the current thrust of education policy discussions nationally. I provide
examples of principal quality reform plans that are already being implemented in other
states and assert that policymakers are adopting these policies without a comprehensive
8

knowledge of the principal labor market in American K-12 public education. I state the
problem of insufficient student achievement for which improvements in principal quality
might form a partial solution. Finally, I provide a rationale for this study by suggesting
that education policymakers in Arkansas would benefit from an exploratory and
analytical investigation of the principal labor market in the state.
Chapter Two has three objectives. First, I discuss and critique the theoretical
policy framework – principal-agent theory (PAT) – on which incentive-based principal
compensation reforms are grounded. The purpose of this policy theory explanation and
analysis is to explore whether in fact incentive-based policies are appropriate for
education reform and how such policies might work. Second, I discuss recent related
research about incentives in the principal labor market, a body of scholarly research to
which this study will contribute. Third, as a foundation for policy recommendations about
monitoring principal performance by analyzing student academic performance, I present
literature to show that principals can, in fact, impact student achievement. This section of
chapter two is essential for this study because policy principals’ attempts to monitor
agent performance are a central problem in principal-agent theory. Further, policy
recommendations calling for monitoring principal performance through data on student
performance would be unfounded and unfair if principals were actually incapable of
impacting student achievement outcomes.
I begin Chapter Three by describing features of the Arkansas principal labor
market that are designed to ensure a high level of principal quality. Specifically, I focus
on the barriers to entry into the labor market including licensure, certification testing,
required experience, and completion of an authorized training program. This exploration
9

of these quality control mechanisms, which are related to principal preparation and
qualifications, contributes to the overall discussion of policies that can positively impact
the quality of educational leadership in the state. In the second part of Chapter Three, I
describe current principal evaluation practices, which are intended to solve the
monitoring difficulty that is a part of the principal-agent theory framework. To set these
current practices in context, I also provide a review of the literature concerning the
dispute over the best methods for monitoring principal performance. The purpose of
including this background is to create an understanding that it is possible for Arkansas
policymakers to consider alternative evaluation, or monitoring, strategies. I conclude
Chapter Three by presenting the other descriptive data related to principal pay patterns in
the state of Arkansas and in the region. This entire chapter is descriptive and provides
context for the study’s analysis of the principal labor market and for the policy
recommendations in Chapter Seven.
In Chapter Four, I present the research questions and hypotheses of the study, and
I describe the methods and data used to answer them. The two research questions are
designed to uncover the factors that are associated with higher levels of principal pay and
with larger changes in principal pay. My first research question focuses on the
relationship between pay differentials and observable characteristics.
Research Question One: To what extent is the level of principal pay impacted by
observable characteristics of the populations they serve and of principals themselves,
including their performance in the prior year?
This first research question concerns the levels of principal pay in Arkansas and
whether there are systematic variations in salary according to principals’ observable
10

characteristics and those of the populations they serve. This question addresses the need
for policymakers to have a comprehensive understanding of the levels of principal
salaries and the factors that drive variations in principal pay across the state. These
potential patterns of variation may have implications for policy, as the placement of
higher paid – and therefore potentially higher quality – principals among certain groups
of students may be contributing to educational inequities across the state. Before
designing policy solutions to ameliorate potential educational inequities, policymakers
need a clear understanding of the principal pay and quality landscape and the nature of
any patterns of principal sorting.
The second question explores if there is a positive relationship between school
performance and annual changes in principal salaries.
Research Question Two: To what extent does a principal’s performance in the
prior year impact the magnitude of the change in his or her salary?
This question concerns whether principals who perform better in the prior year
(meet AYP or have higher percent proficient) earn greater salary increases year-overyear. The answers to the second research question will also inform the study’s primary
policy recommendations. Understanding whether more effective principals earn
differentially higher rewards year-over-year can inform policymakers about the
incentives that currently exist in the principal labor market and can guide their policy
reform decisions about how to improve principal quality.
Chapter Five presents the results for each of the research questions. The first line
of investigation for research question one involves a descriptive analysis to discern
principal pay patterns related to their own characteristics and the characteristics of the
11

populations they serve. This descriptive analysis does not control for the factors that drive
differences in pay, but merely portrays the reality of what types of principals are serving
what types of student populations. Thus, the findings for research question one include
results for two subquestions. The first subquestion findings address: How are principals
sorted among different student populations with regard to their own observable
characteristics and the observable characteristics of the student populations they serve?
That is, without holding constant the factors that impact principal salaries, are principals
of, for example, high poverty districts and schools paid less than those in low poverty
districts and schools? Similarly, how do other school and district characteristics, such as
size of enrollment or percentage of the population that is minority, impact the level of a
principal’s pay? The findings for the second subquestion for research question one
address the following: When controlling for various independent factors that impact the
level of principal pay, which factors drive the differences in principal salaries? For
example, are principals of high minority schools and/or districts, small schools and/or
districts, or high poverty schools and/or districts paid less, when holding equal all other
factors, such as their own experience or degree level? I then present the findings for
research question two.
In Chapter Six, I discuss these findings. This chapter also includes consideration
of the study’s limitations and reflection on potential avenues for further inquiry.
Finally, in Chapter Seven I conclude with policy recommendations for continued
research on this topic and for Arkansas policymakers based on the evidence provided.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter has three objectives. First, I discuss and critique the theoretical
policy framework – principal-agent theory (PAT) – on which incentive-based educator
compensation reforms are grounded (Davies et al., 2005; Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007,
Billger, 2007, Podgursky and Springer, 2007). The purpose of this policy theory
explanation and analysis is to explore whether in fact incentive-based policies are
appropriate for education reform.
Second, I discuss recent related research about incentives in the principal labor
market, a small body of scholarly research to which this study will contribute. This
second body of literature relates directly to the literature on incentive-based reforms to
improve principal quality and indirectly to principal agent theory, as other studies of
related principal quality reforms are also grounded in this theoretical framework.
Third, as a foundation for policy recommendations about monitoring principal
performance by analyzing student academic performance, I present literature to show that
principals can, in fact, impact student achievement. This background is important because
policy recommendations calling for monitoring principal performance through data on
student performance would be unfair and potentially counterproductive if principals were
actually incapable of impacting student achievement outcomes. This third section of
Chapter Two is linked to the rest of the study, since policy principals’ traditional
challenges to monitoring agent performance are a central issue in the principal-agent
framework (Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007).

13

Policy Framework: Principal-Agent Theory
The Conventional Principal-Agent Model
This section presents a discussion of how principal-agent theory, on which
performance pay incentive systems are based, may be applicable to the education policy
reform context. Traditionally, the principal-agent theoretical framework has been applied
to the field of economics to describe and evaluate the relationships between boards of
directors or shareholders and managing executives (Davies et al., 2005; Bohren, 1998;
Shapiro, 2005; Garson, 2007; Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007; Miller, 2005; Garen, 1994).
Over the past thirty years, principal-agent models have been applied to frame
organizational relationships in other disciplines, including sociology and political science
(Bohren, 1998; Worsham and Gatrell, 2005). Recently, principal-agent theory has also
been applied to conceptualize reforms in the education field, specifically those regarding
incentive pay (Ferris, 1992; Davies et al., 2005; Podgursky and Springer, 2007; Billger,
2007; Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007; Goldhaber, 2007).
The central concept of principal-agent theory (PAT) for purposes of public policy
analysis is that policy principals have goals that they need policy agents to accomplish
(Garen, 1994; Petersen, 1993; Ferris, 1992). In a hierarchical transaction between the
policymaker and a policy implementer, the policymaker attempts to identify performance
indicators and to set performance incentives to create goal alignment (Worsham and
Gatrell, 2005; Miller, 2005; Garen). Pursuant to this tasking, the agent chooses a course
of action that may or may not be in compliance with the principal’s interests. In the
conventional principal-agent model, four primary assumptions exist.
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The first assumption of PAT is that both principals and agents are rational actors
whose acts are grounded in self-interest to maximize their own utility (Petersen, 1993;
Waterman and Meier, 1998; Bohren, 1998; Bishop and Wossman, 2004). In a labor
context, utility for the principal is maximized by having the agent fully accomplish the
principal’s goals in the most efficient, cost-effective manner. For the agent, utility is
similarly maximized by accomplishing his or her own goals with the lowest marginal
cost, at a standard that is still satisfactory to the principal (Bohren, 1998; Bishop and
Wossman, 2004). Principals incur agency costs – or losses – when the utility maximizing
behavior of agents does not fulfill the priorities of principals (Miller, 2005; Worsham and
Gatrell, 2005).
As a natural consequence of having self-interested actors, the second assumption
of PAT involves the potential for misalignment of goals between principals and agents
(Miller, 2005; Waterman and Meier, 1998; Ferris, 1992). As mentioned above, PAT
specifies that this misalignment of preferences can lead to shirking because attending to
the principal’s goals can involve costs to the agent, who is assumed to be self-interested
(Miller, 2005; Sappington, 1991; Douglas, 1989; Bishop and Wossman, 2004; Bohren,
1998; Ferris, 1992). In the broader policy literature, goal misalignment is often viewed
as a major challenge to policy reformers. The common term for alignment of goals is goal
congruence, which is the level of coordination and agreement between policy principals
and policy agents in the implementation of public policy. Meyers, Riccucci, and Lurie
(2001) define goal congruence as: “the extent of agreement between the official or formal
policy goals of political officials and the operative goals of the organizations or networks
charged with delivering that policy.” Goal congruence is impacted not only by the
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communication and monitoring of managers, but also by street-level bureaucrats’
discretion and perceptions of the legitimacy of a given policy and its policy principals
(Lipsky, 1980; McDermott, 2004).
A study by Riccucci et al. (2004) in the welfare reform policy context
demonstrates the important role of managerial communication and monitoring in
promoting goal congruence within a given policy context. These researchers investigated
the extent to which front-line workers in welfare offices implemented policy changes.
The welfare reforms of the 1990s shifted the policy focus from granting means-tested
benefits such as food stamps to getting eligible welfare recipients off of welfare and into
jobs. Riccucci et al. (2004) examined how front-line staff evaluated the importance of the
reform’s goals in comparison with their traditional work of processing claims. These
authors also looked at variation in goal priorities across agency settings and at how
managers can influence goal priorities of front-line workers. Riccucci et al. (2004) found
that front-line workers generally prioritized their traditional role of processing benefits
claims ahead of the new goal of getting welfare recipients into jobs. In settings where
managers measured claims processing, front-line workers valued those responsibilities
the most; however, in settings where managers monitored work placements, workers
focused on that goal first. These findings show that managers, who wish to alleviate goal
misalignment and resulting agency costs, must clearly communicate expectations of new
policy priorities and must measure the activities and attitudes that are most important in
the implementation of new policy.
Related to the study by Riccucci et al. (2004) above, the third assumption of PAT
is that barriers often exist to inhibit the effective monitoring of agents by principals
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(Petersen, 1993; Miller, 2005). These difficulties in monitoring may be due to
information asymmetry, whereby the agent has a knowledge and skill advantage over the
principal (Ferris, 1992; Miller, 2005). These monitoring difficulties and asymmetrical
information can lead to contractual inefficiencies that benefit the agent. It is for this
reason that principals may seek to create incentives to motivate agents appropriately
(Garen, 1994; Miller 2005). Incentives for performance can provide rewards for
exceptional performance, such as through bonuses or profit-sharing (Shapiro, 2005).
Alternatively, principals can use sanctions for poor performance, such as discontinuing
an agent’s contract. Because agents are presumed to be are risk averse (Shapiro, 2005;
Sappington, 1991; Garson, 2007; Douglas, 1989), the use of sanctions can be especially
powerful to motivate goal alignment.
The fourth assumption of conventional PAT involves the ability of principals to
set contractual provisions unilaterally (Miller, 2005). To the degree that this assumption
holds, principals will yield extraordinary power. In hierarchical relationships, both
principals and agents have power. To a certain extent, however, power actually rests with
the agent and not with the policy principal because the agent is the one who must carry
out the principal’s directives and because the agent has an information and skill
advantage (Miller, 2005; Garson, 2007; Waterman and Meier, 1998; Ferris, 1992).
Revisions to Basic Principal-Agent Theory
Various scholars (e.g., Waterman and Meier, 1998; Perrow, 1986; Worsham and
Gatrell, 2005) have proposed revisions to the basic principal-agent model and expanded
its applicability to explain organizational dynamics in settings that do not contain all
features demanded by the conventional PAT model. Waterman and Meier (1998) argue
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that two of the key assumptions behind the theory – information asymmetry and goal
conflict – do not always hold. They offer an alternative view of the principal-agent
relationship that in some policy contexts approximates an advocacy coalition framework.
Though their suggestion is not entirely useful for describing the relationships between
teachers and school principals and their policy principals, Waterman and Meier’s (1998)
challenge to the rigid assumption of information asymmetry may have some value in
conceptualizing the principal-agent relationship in education.
Waterman and Meier’s (1998) objections to the notion that there must be a
profound information asymmetry between principal and agent may be enlightening for
analysis of the education policy context, as it is not obvious what information advantage
the agents in this setting have. Perhaps, the information asymmetry could lead to school
principals or teachers arguing as agents that they should not be held accountable for
student achievement gains because they cannot control such outcomes. By arguing from
the position of the front-line bureaucrat that only they know how much their students can
achieve, teachers or school principals could perhaps attempt to create a low system of
accountability for measurable and transparent outcomes (Ferris, 1992).
In this study of education policy, I incorporate some of Waterman and Meier’s
challenges to conventional PAT, but I also argue that many aspects of the conventional
PAT are fitting. I argue that policy principals (school boards) can employ relatively
objective and publicly available measures to set performance targets for their agents,
(school principals) as a way to minimize agency costs. Thus, the assumption of a
profound information asymmetry can be resolved and need not apply in this policy
context. However, I do not accept Waterman and Meier’s (1998) objection to the notion
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that goal conflict as a constant in the principal-agent model. Rather, I assert the
applicability of this assumption in the education policy context, as conflict between
principals and agents about policy goals in public education is a commonly accepted
phenomenon.
Many scholars have also identified potential weaknesses in the explanatory power
of the conventional PAT model because it assumes a single principal and a single agent
(Miller, 2005; Waterman and Meier, 1998; Shapiro, 2005; Worsham and Gatrell, 2005;
Ferris, 1992). Citing the work of Mitnick (1973), Waterman and Meier (1998) write that
the basic principal-agent model cannot predict which goals agents will embrace when
they must serve multiple principals with multiple and, sometimes, conflicting goals.
Moreover, as Shapiro (2005) notes, the basic model does not account for the fact that
there are agents and principals who have dual roles. That is, middle managers, such as
school principals, must attend to the directives of their superiors (school boards), while at
the same time acting as principals monitoring the actions of agents (teachers).
Worsham and Gatrell (2005) assert that incorporating the complexity of multiple
principals into the principal-agent model is a sine qua non for its use. They write:
“Agency theory, then, can offer important insights into why bureaucracy does what it
does as long as one recognizes that the relationship is one in which multiple principals
work to influence the actions of bureaucratic agents in a constantly evolving process” (p.
365). Indeed, Worsham and Gatrell (2005) convincingly argue that the traditional model
should be extended to include consideration of the actions and incentives of agents when
there are multiple principals, whose potentially conflicting goals may exacerbate the
problems of goal conflict inherent in hierarchical, bureaucratic relationships.
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Worsham and Gatrell (2005) examined an expanded principal-agent model in
their study of how policy principals can attempt to influence the behavior or agents
through signaling about issue salience, rather than through direct legislative action that
codifies agent responsibility. That is, Worsham and Gatrell (2005) were concerned with
principals can effectively communicate their policy goals to agents through indirect
methods. Specifically, Worsham and Gatrell (2005) studied how potential policy
principals at the federal level have attempted to signal to agents – in the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) – that they should
focus their efforts on particular policy goals when conducting rulemaking activities.
In examining how policy principals attempt to influence agents in federal
rulemaking, Worsham and Gatrell (2005) found that signaling through indirect methods –
e.g. the holding of hearings or media reports relating policymaker preference – has less of
an impact on BIA agency rulemaking than on FERC agency rulemaking. Worsham and
Gatrell (2005) hypothesized that differences in the agencies may explain this
phenomenon. They explained that the key difference between FERC and BIA agencies
involves the degree of complexity in the policy context. Worsham and Gatrell (2005)
portrayed the organizational structure, the institutional history, and the personnel
involved in FERC as creating an environment conducive to effective signaling through
indirect methods of communication. Regarding the BIA on the other hand, Worsham and
Gatrell “[suggested] that the mix of policy types that constitutes BIA policy, the historical
problems with regard to clear lines of authority and subunit coordination, the lack of
professional training and normally low morale among BIA personnel, along with the
congressional urge to micro-manage various aspects of BIA policy responsibilities,
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makes the BIA a particularly difficult agent to signal” (p. 367). Worsham and Gatrell’s
(2005) analysis of the obstacles to achieving goal congruence in complex policy contexts
that mirror the BIA be instructive when policymakers are looking to cut through the
intricate web of conflicting policy goals and messages that can confound principal-agent
relationships. That is, Worsham and Gatrell’s (2005) analysis identifies how difficult it
can be in certain policy contexts for policy principals to use indirect communication
methods to align their policy goals with agent action.
Worsham and Gatrell’s (2005) expanded principal-agent model, which includes
multiple principals and multiple agents, is instructive for achieving goal congruence in
education reform policy context. Worsham and Gatrell’s (2005) description of the
complex policy environment in which the BIA operates has many similarities to the
education policy context in which school principals act as agents. The public education
policy climate is marked by unclear lines of authority, a diversity of policy mandates,
attempts of state and local policymakers to micromanage implementation, and historical
problems regarding coordination across levels of government. Thus, as in the complex
BIA policy context, education policy principals may similarly find indirect
communication about issue salience to be insufficient for achieving goal congruence. In
the education reform policy context, policy principals can perhaps communicate much
more clearly and successfully by setting transparent performance indicators tied to
performance awards as a way to signal to agents the goals that should become their
priorities (Davies et al., 2005; Ferris, 1992). In the next section, I describe how this
setting of financial awards, that are linked to high levels of achievement, can provide
incentives to maximize agent efforts in a manner consistent with policy principals’ goals.

21

Setting Incentives to Resolve Perceived Goal Misalignments
As noted above, the complexity of having multiple principals and agents with
their own priorities can lead to severe goal misalignment in public sector work, including
education policy context (Burgess and Ratto, 2003; Propper and Wilson, 2003;
Goldhaber, 2007). To align goals and minimize agency costs, education policy principals
may wish to adopt performance-based compensation policies that tie compensation to
increases in student achievement. Setting incentives tied to transparent, publicly available
performance measures can resolve monitoring difficulties inherent in principal-agent
relationships and can improve goal congruence by signaling clearly about policy
priorities (Ferris, 1992). Moreover, when designed properly and implemented
successfully, performance pay policies in education have the potential to raise student
achievement (Lavy, 2007; Figlio and Kenney, 2006; Podgursky and Springer; 2007).
However, policy principals (school boards) considering these pay reforms should be
aware of threats to successful policy implementation.
One significant obstacle to successful implementation of performance-based pay
reforms is teacher, or agent, buy-in. Even if policy principals, such as school boards, are
able to agree upon using student achievement as measured on standardized tests as a way
to monitor performance, ultimately teachers and principals have to adopt the goal of
raising student achievement as their own priority (McDermott, 2004). That is, in
choosing the right incentives to motivate policy actors, policymakers must they also must
keep in mind how policy agents will respond to the incentives. One possibility is that
educators will see themselves as having to abandon their commitments to serving the
needs of young people because the incentives created by policy principals do not align
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with teachers’ concepts of their duties to attend to student needs (McDermott, 2004;
Lipsky, 1980). As Lipsky (1980) suggested in his scholarship on street-level bureaucrats,
educators may object to measurement of performance by student test scores and view
these policy prescriptions and their superiors who support such prescriptions as
illegitimate.
In her article about the implementation of education reform policy in
Massachusetts’s K-12 public schools during the 1990s, McDermott (2004) showed that in
the education policy context, educators’ perceptions of the legitimacy of the leaders who
determine education policy at both the state and local level impact the implementation of
policy. McDermott (2004) examined how street-level bureaucrats viewed the legitimacy
of policy mandates imposed by policy principals at the state level. McDermott explained
that teachers at the local school level did not embrace the accountability reforms because
they had a mistrust of the top level bureaucrats and saw them as imposing a punitive
policy from above. McDermott showed how cooperation between state bureaucrats and
teachers never truly occurred, and her case study demonstrates how a lack of cooperation
can threaten goal congruence and the successful implementation of policy. To some
degree, her findings confirm the theory Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) and deLeon and
deLeon (2002) who note that a high level of cooperation at multiple implementation
levels is necessary for successful policy implementation.
One way that policymakers can seek to get teacher and school principal buy-in to
support performance-based pay is to involve teachers and school principals in the design
of their merit pay plans (Heneman, Milanowski, and Kimball, 2007). Indeed, one
characteristic of well-conceived policy is that, though the original policy intents may be
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addressed at a hierarchically super-ordinate level, the ultimate implementation decisions
are left to policy actors at the street level, who can develop an appropriate
implementation strategy that would best fit their local circumstances (DeLeon and
DeLeon, 2002). That is, even though state policymakers can mandate that localities
implement performance-based pay that involves measuring educator success by gains in
student achievement on standardized tests, policy principals may wish to include policy
agents in designing performance-based pay programs the local level.
By tying compensation directly to student performance, as measured by their
gains on standardized tests, policy principals in the education policy context can reform
the institution of public education in a way that will align goals of all actors in the
institution (Billger, 2007). An emerging body of literature has begun to explore the role
and existence of performance incentives in school principal labor markets. In the
following section, I describe this literature to which my study will contribute.
Incentives in the Principal Labor Market
In his own study on principal compensation, Goldhaber (2007) noted that little
research has been performed on principal compensation systems and the viability of
performance pay programs for these school leaders. At the time of writing, Goldhaber
(2007) succinctly stated: “there doesn’t seem to be a single large-scale quantitative study
linking the pay structure of principals to any measure of performance that includes
student achievement” (p. 8). My own literature review largely confirms Goldhaber’s
assertions about the paucity of scholarship in this field. 1

1

For the review of literature on the role of pay incentives in the principal labor market, I searched major
academic databases, internet search engines, and reference lists of articles located. To be included, an
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In addition to reviewing Goldhaber’s study, I include the work of a few other
researchers who have begun to explore accountability mechanisms and incentives in
school principal labor markets. For example, Cullen and Mazzeo (2008) and Billger
(2007) have recently investigated whether some aspect of pay for performance for
principals may already exist. Additionally, a specific program evaluation by Ladd (1999)
considered how performance monitoring of principals can lead to changes in the
composition of the principal workforce. These research studies constitute the small body
of research that delves into whether principals’ career paths and compensation might be
tied to the success of their schools in producing desired educational outcomes.
In his own study of principal compensation referenced above, Goldhaber (2007)
used the principal-agent framework to explore school principal compensation generally
and the potential presence of performance pay systems for school principals specifically.
With three years of data (1993-94, 1999-00, and 2003-04) from the nationally
representative Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), Goldhaber investigated the factors
that are responsible for the variation in the level of school principals’ salaries. He
regressed principal salary on observable characteristics of principals – including their
race, experience, and degree level – and of the populations they served – including school
size, school level, school racial composition, school poverty, school urbanicity – to make
inferences about the potential presence of performance pay. Goldhaber found that 45
percent of the variance in principal salaries could be explained by observable variables.
In particular, he noted that “…more experience is rewarded; urban and suburban
principals receive substantially higher salaries than those in rural schools; principals in
scholarly article had to be conducted after 1988, had to involve the compensation of school principals in the
United States, and had to include a quantitative measure of performance or the use of principal salary data.
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larger districts or leading larger schools receive higher salaries; and secondary school
principals receive higher salaries than those leading elementary schools” (p. 12). He also
found that there were significant returns to having an advanced degree beyond a master’s.
Goldhaber (2007) then suggested that part of the unmeasured variation in principal
salaries may be due to performance pay components. He contrasted the 45 percent of
measured variation in principal pay due to observables to an accepted figure of 60 percent
of measured variation in teacher salaries due to observables. Based on this difference in
variation explained, Goldhaber (2007) proposed that it is more probable for principals
than teachers to have part of their compensation determined by performance pay.
The one large-scale study of principal pay that includes performance measures
was conducted recently by Cullen and Mazzeo (2008). Situating their study in a
principal-agent theoretical framework, Cullen and Mazzeo (2008) analyzed the
relationships between the performance of Texas schools between 1989 and 2006 and the
career paths of school principals. They argued that their data set was particularly well
suited to the investigation of this question because it “combines the ‘monitoring’
information – detailed campus-level scores from state-administered standardized tests –
and the ‘incentives’ information – the complete employment and wage histories of all
school principals during this period” (p. 2). In analyzing the career paths of full-time
principals, they found that principals of the highest performing schools experienced
greater increases in wages than did principals of low performing schools when moving to
new positions. Moreover, when examining the wage changes for principals who remained
at their current jobs, they found that principals of the highest performing schools
similarly experienced greater wage growth than did principals of low performing schools.
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Their findings suggest that there are implicit rewards in the principal labor market related
to higher performance.
In a loosely related study mentioned by both Goldhaber (2007) and Cullen and
Mazzeo (2008), Billger (2007) investigated whether the presence of accountability
mechanisms leads to greater school and principal performance. Billger’s (2007)
definition of accountability was that a school faced some level of public reporting or
publicly communicated performance goals. However, she did not require that a school
would face sanctions for poor performance for it to be operating under an accountability
system. Using cross-sectional data from the 1999-2000 restricted-use Schools and
Staffing Survey (SASS), Billger’s study is of little value. At best, her correlational
findings regarding implicit threat of sanctions associated with public reporting give a
glimpse into some principal pay and performance patterns. In this study set in a preNCLB public education context, Billger reports that “[state] sanctions correspond to more
negative salaries for the worst principals and higher salaries for the best, suggesting that
these sanctions may be an effective reward/punish system. On the other hand, [she finds]
that other accountability measures correspond to lower salaries, particularly for the best
principals, suggesting that strong performance may not be well-rewarded in this labor
market” (p. 21).
In another related study of how accountability and performance award systems
impact various aspect of school including principals, Ladd (1999) analyzed the impacts
of the Dallas Independent School District’s school-based performance incentive program.
In this program which started in 1991, schools were measured on their ability to raise
student performance on standardized tests. Those schools that were most effective –
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approximately the top 20 percent in the district – received financial bonuses, which were
distributed to everyone on the school staff, including principals. In addition to seeing
positive impacts on student performance that were at least in part attributable to the
program, Ladd (1999) found a dramatic increase in principal turnover over the course of
the performance incentive program’s implementation. Ladd showed that prior to the
program, principal turnover rates in least effective schools, average effective schools, and
most effective schools were 2.4 percent, 6.7 percent, and 6.3 percent, respectively. By the
end of the program these rates had increased to 24.6 percent, 25.0 percent, and 24.4
percent, respectively. Ladd (1999) asserted, “Thus, it appears that the new emphasis on
accountability made the District much more willing than in the past to change principals”
(p. 14). She concluded that this compositional effect on the principal workforce may have
been due to the program and that this change, which was most dramatic in the lowest
performing schools, could have positive impacts on student performance.
Three conclusions might be drawn from these studies. First, higher rewards for
performance may exist implicitly in the labor market (Cullen and Mazzeo, 2008) or
explicitly through targeted incentive pay programs (Ladd, 1999; Goldhaber, 2007).
Second, when pay is related to performance, there is a potential for positive outcomes,
such as sorting more effective principals into higher paying positions (Cullen and
Mazzeo, 2008; Billger, 2007) or the removal of potentially less effective principals from
the profession (Ladd, 1999). Third, this important area of research has not been
sufficiently probed, and policymakers appear to have little concrete research on which to
base incentive policy reforms to improve principal quality.

28

These studies on policies involving pay incentives for school leaders to bring
about gains in student academic achievement assume that principals can actually impact
student learning. Above, I argued that agents must see the policy prescriptions as
legitimate for successful policy implementation (McDermott, 2004; Lipsky, 1980;
Goldhaber, 2007). For this reason, in the next section, I present research to support
legitimacy of using student academic achievement data to monitor and reward principal
performance.

The Validity of Monitoring Principal Performance by Measuring Student
Achievement

As a foundation for policy recommendations about monitoring principal
performance by analyzing student academic performance, I present literature showing
that principals can, in fact, impact student achievement. As explained above, how policy
principals attempt to monitor agent performance is a central issue in principal-agent
theory. This background literature on how school principals can impact student outcomes
is essential for this study because policy recommendations calling for monitoring
principal performance through data on student performance might be perceived as
illegitimate and unfair if principals were incapable of impacting student achievement
outcomes. As McDermott (2004) and Goldhaber (2007) note, perceptions by agents
(school principals) that they would be held accountable for outcomes out of their control
might undermine chances for successful policy implementation.
In a meta-analysis of studies that measured the magnitude of the direct
relationship between principals and student achievement, Marzano et al. (2005) included
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studies after 1970 and in US schools or in school settings akin to those in the US. These
studies all measured student achievement with a standardized achievement test and
reported statistics that would allow for computation of effect sizes. Of the 69 included
studies, the majority of studies (39) were conducted in elementary schools, with the other
30 studies distributed relatively evenly over the other school levels.
In these studies of principal effectiveness, the independent variable was teacher
ratings of principal leadership from questionnaires. The analysis was conducted at the
school level, so “each school had a single summary score representing the average
achievement of the students and one or more summary scores representing the average
perception of teachers regarding general leadership behavior and one or more specific
leadership behaviors of the principal” (p. 30). The authors then calculated a correlation
between the ratings of general leadership and student achievement. They found a
correlation of .25, and they explain this correlation to mean that an increase in certain
principal behaviors by one standard deviation “is associated with a gain in the overall
achievement of the school from the 50th percentile to the 60th percentile” (p. 30). Marzano
et al. did not report statistically significant differences in the relationship between
leadership and achievement at the different levels of schools. Thus, this meta-analysis
provides some evidence that principals can impact student achievement as measured on
standardized tests.
Witziers, Bosker, and Kruger (2003) also conducted a meta-analysis to determine
the degree to which principals directly affect student achievement. They framed their
study in the context of whether holding principals responsible for student achievement is
a reasonable and valid accountability approach. Witziers and colleagues included studies
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conducted from 1986 to 1996 that had valid measures both of principal leadership and of
student achievement. Of the 37 qualifying studies, 25 used data from the International
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) on reading literacy in
25 different countries. Witziers and colleagues found positive significant effects for
principal leadership on student achievement, but their effect sizes were quite small.
Including all studies, they found an effect of 0.02, and without the IEA studies, they
calculated and effect size of 0.04. When isolating studies conducted in the US at the
elementary school level, they found the effect size of leadership on student achievement
to be 0.11. Despite the findings in this small sample, Witziers and colleagues concluded
that principals do not directly affect student achievement and that leadership does not
appear to matter more in US schools than in other countries.
Both Marzano et al. (2005) and Witziers et al. (2003) used teacher ratings of
principal behaviors as the measure of principal effectiveness. Then, they associated
student achievement with these teacher ratings. So the critical assumption, or link, in
concluding that principals who are better at leadership have students who perform better
on tests is based on the assertion that teacher ratings of principals are in fact an
appropriate and accurate assessment of principal leadership behaviors. Using this
methodology, Marzano et al. (2005) found a strong relationship between these two
variables, and Witziers et al. (2003) did not.
As Marzano et al. (2005) point out, three differences exist between these metaanalyses that account for the difference in their findings. First, 25 of the 37 studies in the
Witziers et al. (2003) analysis were international studies. Second, Marzano et al. make
more of an effort to exclude outliers in their main analysis. Third, Marzano et al. conduct
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an attenuation adjustment to address the relatively low reliability of the study’s
instruments. These instruments were student achievement tests and leadership behavior
surveys, each of which had a separate reliability coefficient. This adjustment inflated
their correlations by dividing the first correlation by the square root of the reliability of
the instrument.
In reviewing the findings and methodologies of these studies, it appears that
Marzano and colleagues have made a strong effort to show that leadership matters and
Witziers and colleagues set out to show the opposite. The Marzano et al. study is most
relevant for a study of leadership in US schools, but the efforts to inflate the correlation
probably overstate a principal’s direct effect in these studies. The central finding of the
Witziers et al. study is not particularly relevant, given that the majority of studies were
conducted abroad. Combined with the positive, but overstated, findings of the Marzano
study, the findings in the limited study of leadership in US elementary schools from the
Witziers et al. study suggest that principal leadership probably does directly impact
student achievement. However, these conclusions should be qualified because both of
these meta-analyses use a rather suspect measure of principal leadership effectiveness –
i.e. teacher perception surveys.
The majority of the studies included in these meta-analyses and of other
descriptive studies focus on elementary school principals. A standout individual, largescale study by Brewer (1993) at the high school level is also worth mentioning. Brewer
conducted his analysis on data from High School and Beyond, a national survey by the
US Department of Education from 1980-1986 which measured the verbal and
quantitative attainment of a representative sample of 10th and 12th grade students in 1100
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high schools nationwide. Brewer’s dependent variable was the gain in achievement for
those 10th graders who were tested in 1980 and then again as seniors in 1982. The
independent variables related to principal characteristics – such as a principal’s prior
years of experience as a teacher, prior years as an administrator, years of experience in
current head of school role, percentage of total faculty appointed during his/her tenure,
and the focus of a principal on academic goals – came from the Administrator and
Teacher Survey. Of these independent variables, the percentage of total faculty appointed
during a principal’s tenure and the focus of a principal on academic goals had significant
positive effects on student achievement gains. Moreover, Brewer found that “The greater
the percentage of teachers appointed by a principal with high academic goals (PTACH)
the higher are student test score gains; the greater the percentage of teachers appointed by
a principal with low academic goals (PTACL) the lower are student test score gains” (p.
286-87). Brewer’s study (1993) suggests that principals can impact student achievement
and indicates two of the ways in which principals’ actions can lead to academic success.
Brewer’s study was also included in a descriptive synthesis of research on
principals and their impacts on student achievement conducted by Heck and Hallinger
(1998). These authors characterize the principal actions in Brewer’s study as indirect, or
mediated. That is, Heck and Hallinger (1998) argue that principals can best contribute to
improving the effectiveness of schools through influencing the school culture and the
values and goals of teachers. Heck and Hallinger’s research synthesis involved 40
studies of principals and student achievement, of which 11 occurred outside of the US.
Their main finding was that “principals exercise a measurable, though indirect effect on
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school effectiveness and student achievement” (p. 186). They add, “While this indirect
effect is relatively small, it is statistically significant, and we assert, meaningful” (p. 186).
Other descriptive syntheses (e.g. Cotton, 2003; Leithwood, Seashore Louis,
Anderson, and Wahlstrom, 2004) also point to positive impacts of principals on student
achievement and attempt to isolate the behaviors of principals that tend to lead to greater
student achievement. For example, Leithwood and colleagues (2004) asserted that
successful principals must “create and sustain a competitive school,” “empower others to
make significant decisions,” “provide instructional guidance,” and “develop and
implement strategic school improvement plans” (p. 26-27). In her narrative review of the
literature, Cotton (2003) identified 25 principal behaviors that impact student
achievement, such as creating a safe environment and being a role model of
professionalism.
Based on these descriptive studies and the empirical evidence in the metaanalyses and standout studies, it is probably fair to conclude that principals can impact
student achievement to varying degrees. Despite the research that exists on direct
principal impacts on student achievement, researchers such as Nettles and Herrington
(2007) argue that there needs to be more research on direct effects of principals on
student achievement using more recent student level data and better methodologies.
Contrary to their views on existing direct effects studies, Nettles and Harrington
suggested that studies of indirect effects of principals have been relatively conclusive that
principals matter for student achievement.
Thus, with these findings in mind, it appears that the implementation of
performance-based pay incentives should not be undermined the legitimacy of
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monitoring principal performance through measurement of student achievement gains. Of
course, before holding school principals accountable for student achievement gains,
policy principals would need to ensure that conditions are in place to support school
principal empowerment. Otherwise, school principals may be reluctant to embrace this
system of measurement as legitimate.
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Chapter 3: Practices Designed to Affect Quality in the Arkansas Principal Labor
Market
I begin this chapter by describing features of the Arkansas principal labor market
that are designed to ensure a high level of principal quality. Specifically, I focus on the
barriers to entry into the labor market including licensure, certification testing, required
experience, and completion of an authorized training program. This exploration of these
quality control mechanisms in Arkansas, which are related to principal preparation and
qualifications, contributes to the overall discussion of policies that can positively impact
the quality of educational leadership in the state.
Next in Chapter Three, I describe current principal evaluation practices, which are
intended to solve the monitoring difficulty that is a part of the principal-agent theory
framework. To set these current practices in context, I also provide a review of the
literature concerning the dispute over the best methods for monitoring principal
performance. The purpose of including this background literature is to create an
understanding that it is possible for Arkansas policymakers to consider alternative
evaluation, or monitoring, strategies. This chapter is descriptive and provides context for
the study’s analysis of the principal labor market and for the policy recommendations in
Chapter Seven.
The final section of this chapter is a presentation of other descriptive data related
to principal pay patterns in the state of Arkansas and in the region. These data on average
levels of administrator pay allow for comparisons of the findings in the study’s original
analysis. This entire chapter is descriptive and provides context for the study’s analysis of
the principal labor market and for the policy recommendations in Chapter Seven.
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The data necessary for the exploration of the topics in this chapter come from the
Arkansas Department of Education manuals and website, various websites of Arkansas
colleges of education, the website of the Educational Testing Service (ETS), from various
higher education institution websites, and from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I also
conducted phone interviews with key personnel at the Arkansas Department of Education
to learn more about current licensure and training practices.
Barriers to Entry into the Principal Labor Market
One intent of requiring educators to go through certain training and licensure
programs is to ensure that they have the knowledge and skills to be effective practitioners
(Hess, 2001). A related aspect of principal certification is that it may deter insufficiently
committed or incapable prospects from entering the field of school leadership. Typically,
when professions erect barriers to entry by requiring licensure, there is a belief that the
required coursework and past experience in the profession are directly related to future
effectiveness (Hess, 2001). In essence, through these barriers to entry, the profession is
attempting to establish a floor on quality. In this section, I present information about the
various obstacles that prospective principals must overcome to obtain licensure. This
section contains an overview of the certification process, a detailed look at the state’s
principal training programs, and a short clarification about the different types of
administrator licenses. This information about entry into the labor market is relevant to
the overall study, as it provides context for investigation of performance and pay of those
who obtain employment as principals.
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Overview of the Arkansas Principal Certification Process
Principals can serve in Arkansas public schools by participating one of two
different programs - the traditional route for principals and the Administrator Licensure
Completion Program (ALCP) (Rules, 2003).
Under the traditional preparation route, principals must meet four criteria. First,
principals must have completed four years of teaching experience, of which three years
must have been at the level that the principal license covers (Rules, 2003). Second, the
principal must have earned a graduate degree in educational leadership from a NCATE or
regionally accredited administrator preparation program approved by the Arkansas
Department of Education (Rules, 2003). If a prospective principal has earned a graduate
degree in a field other than educational leadership, he/she can undertake a specialized
plan of study as determined by one of the approved principal training programs in the
state (Rules, 2003). Third, principals, who participate in an approved educational
leadership program and those with graduate degrees in other fields, must complete an
internship and a principal portfolio (Rules, 2003). The internship is coordinated as a part
of the principal’s preparation program, and it places the prospective principal in an
administrative role under the supervision of a current administrator. The principal
portfolio is also completed as a part of the principal’s preparation program, and this body
of work contains evidence that the candidate has demonstrated competence in the
knowledge and skills covered by the Arkansas Administrator Licensure Standards (Rules,
2003). The fourth requirement is that the principal have a valid Arkansas Standard
Teacher License (Rules, 2003).
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Upon proof of completion of these four requirements, principals can earn the
Initial Administrator License, which is valid for up to three years (Rules, 2003). To apply
for the Standard Administrator License, the principal must have participated in
Administrator Induction, which is an official mentoring program that lasts between one
and three years. During the induction period, a beginning principal works with his/her
assigned mentor to complete a Professional Learning Plan according to state guidelines
(Beginning Administrator Induction Program, 2007). By the end of the induction period,
the principal must pass a state-mandated licensure principal assessment exam (Beginning
Administrator Induction Program, 2007). The passing score on the School Leader
Licensure Assessment is 158 (see Table 3.1 below), and students have up to three years
from the time of graduation from an approved program to meet this requirement
(Educational Testing Service, 2008). Upon completion of these requirements, a principal
obtains the Standard Administrator License (Rules, 2003).
Arkansas is one of 17 states and Washington, DC, which require that principals
pass the School Leaders Licensure Assessment (SLLA) (Educational Testing Service,
2008). Administered by the Educational Testing Service (ETS), this six-hour exam aims
to test whether principals can demonstrate the knowledge and skills represented in the
ISLLC standards (Educational Testing Service, 2008). The format includes four sections
which require the examinee to write written responses to case studies and situations in
which a principal must decide the best course of action (Educational Testing Service,
2008). One section also prompts examinees to analyze data related to teaching and
learning (Educational Testing Service, 2008).

39

The test score range on this exam is 100-200, and ETS reports that individual
states set their own passing scores for this exam (Educational Testing Service, 2008). For
19,364 test takers nationally from 2004-07, the median score was 178, and the reported
average score range was 172-183 (Educational Testing Service, 2008). Passing scores by
state are presented in Table 3.1 below. Policymakers may want to consider if this
relatively lenient requirement is actually accomplishing its intended goal.
Table 3.1: State Passing Scores on the SLLA
State*
Passing Score
Rank
California
173
1
Louisiana
168
2
Maine
168
3
Missouri
167
4
Indiana
165
5
Kansas
165
6
Kentucky
165
7
Mississippi
165
8
Virginia
165
9
Connecticut
161
10
Washington, DC
160
11
Arkansas
158
12
Maryland
157
13
Tennessee
156
14
North Carolina
155
15
New Jersey
148
16
*Georgia’s score not reported.

The second route for principals to serve as administrators is to participate in the
Administrator Licensure Completion Program (ALCP), which is coordinated through the
Office of Professional Licensure. The ACLP is an alternate administrator certification
program for personnel who have been hired into an administrative role prior to
completing the traditional certification route. Any one of the three administrator licenses
can be earned through this program, and the temporary license granted to participants is
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valid for up to three years. To participate in ALCP, a principal must have a Standard
Teaching License, have four years of teaching experience (three years of which must
have been at the level in which the principal is serving), be enrolled in an approved
educational leadership graduate program, and have already been hired as a principal.
Principals, who have not completed a traditional licensure program, may only
serve as a building administrator in an Arkansas public school if they obtain a waiver
from the ADE. School districts may submit requests to the Director of the Department
of Education for temporary waivers (up to three years) for principals who do not have
administrator licenses if that potential principal has demonstrated applicable skills and
knowledge. The request must include a justification of need for the waiver, the
qualifications of the potential principal, the outcome expectations for the principal, and
an annual accountability plan. Principals who serve successfully under the waiver
program do not earn an initial or standard administrator license. During the 2007-08
school year, 19 building level administrators were granted waivers and permitted to serve
in public schools across the state.
Training Programs for Arkansas Principals
A key barrier to entry into the principalship is completion of a master’s degree
from an approved principal training program (Arkansas Department of Education, 2009).
Nine universities in Arkansas are approved to train public school principals (building
administrators), curriculum/program administrators, and district administrators (Arkansas
Department of Education, 2009). These degree programs are at the following institutions:
Arkansas State University, Arkansas Tech University, Harding University, Henderson
State University, Southern Arkansas University, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville,
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University of Arkansas at Little Rock, University of Arkansas at Monticello, and
University of Central Arkansas (Arkansas Department of Education, 2009). The master’s
level coursework is offered at each of these nine universities as a part of principal
preparation programs that lead to licensure, both for both the P-8 and 7-12 building
administrator licenses.
Basic facts about the approved administrator licensure preparation programs at
Arkansas State University, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, and the University of
Arkansas at Little Rock are presented as examples in Appendix A. The coursework
required for each master’s degree program can be found in Appendix B.
The Three Administrator Licenses in Arkansas
Completion of a master’s degree at an approved principal training program is
necessary for licensure, but not sufficient. Moreover, there is not just one type of
certification for principals, as the various licenses only cover certain areas of
responsibility.
Three levels of administrator licensure exist to qualify administrators to serve in
public schools and public school districts in Arkansas the state. First, the building level
administrator license, which is the basic license that covers principals, vice principals,
and assistant principals, is issued to cover either grades P-8 or 7-12. Before a principal
can earn the Standard Administrator License, which is valid for five years, beginning
principals must complete the requirements associated with the Initial Building Level
Administrator License. Second, the curriculum/program administrator licenses exist to
certify administrators responsible for coordinating specialized programs and personnel.
Like the building level administrator license, the curriculum/program administrator
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licenses are issued for a certain group of grades. Curriculum/program administrators can
be certified in the following areas: special education, gifted and talented education, career
and technical education, content area specialist, and curriculum specialist. The third
administrator license is the district level administrator license which qualifies
superintendents, assistant superintendents, and deputy superintendents. The district level
administrator license covers grades P-12.
This first section of Chapter Three included discussion of the training and
licensure process that attempts to ensure a high level of quality for incoming principals.
In the rest of this chapter, I present research about the various methods for measuring
principal performance once they have moved through the certification process and are on
the job. The presentation of research on the debate over methods for monitoring principal
performance is included because policymakers should be aware that there is not
consensus in the field about how best to evaluate principals. Armed with an awareness
that there is not an established “best practice” when it comes to principal evaluation,
policymakers may feel more willing to experiment with new ways to measure principal
effectiveness. I conclude the chapter by describing the performance monitoring system
that currently exists in Arkansas.
The Debate over Methods for Monitoring Principal Performance
As indicated in the discussion of principal agent theory in Chapter Two, the
manner in which policy agents are evaluated and compensated can direct their actions
and lead them to prioritize certain job responsibilities (Ferris, 1992; Riccucci et al.,
2004). The debate over the best method for evaluating school principals is complicated
by the fact that principals have multiple responsibilities and must serve a wide and
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diverse group of stakeholders. As Green (2004) notes, principals must be master teachers,
understand curriculum, maintain and enforce student discipline, manage building level
finances, and serve as a human resources specialist. In these roles, principals must meet
the often conflicting demands of teachers, students, parents, central office personnel,
school board members, and the community at large (Slaughter, 1989; Green, 2004;
Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007). As such, these sundry roles and responsibilities can make the
choices about evaluation of principal performance complicated (Brown, Irby, and
Neumeyer, 1998).
In this section, I present the existing research on principal evaluation to set the
stage for the study’s main research question regarding whether Arkansas K-12 public
school principals are evaluated and, in fact, held accountable based on school’s academic
performance. This research on the current approaches to the evaluation of school
principals provides a background for assessing the suitability of principal performance
pay policies that rely on student achievement outcomes as a measure of principal
performance.
Green (2004) asserts that the three reasons to evaluate principals involve the need
for superintendents to have data for making informed personnel decisions, the need for
the school board to clarify expectations to school leaders, and the need for principals to
identify areas for professional development. These claims regarding evaluation of
principals in the US are similar to research in Canada. For example, Thomas, Holdaway,
and Ward (2000) found that Canadian superintendents reported evaluating principals for
the purposes of “promot[ing] professional growth and improvement,” “provid[ing]
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information for administrative decisions,” and “clarify[ing] and communicat[ing] role
expectations” (p. 225).
Though the reasons for evaluation appear straightforward, there is less agreement
about which of these goals in principal evaluation should be stressed the most. Not only
is there a lack of consensus over which of the goals of evaluation should take priority, but
there is also contention regarding the various evaluation methods used. Slaughter (1989)
asserts that a “sound principal evaluation system has five characteristics: it pinpoints
principal accountability; it is understandable; it is manageable; it is fair; and it is
supported by members of the school board” (p. 3). As Ediger (2002) asserts, “there are a
plethora of methods to use in assessing the achievement of school principals” (p. 90). I
have divided these evaluation methods into two categories: evaluation focused on process
and evaluation focused on outcomes.
The policy relevance of this study is in part related to whether changes in
principal pay are impacted by the outcomes of a principal’s actions. The stated policy in
Arkansas is for principal performance to be monitored based on process, not outcomes. If
I find that principal pay is not positively impacted by student performance, then this
finding may suggest that the stated policy is in fact being implemented.
However, if I find that changes in principal pay are impacted by student
performance, there will be evidence that an implicit monitoring and rewards system
based on student outcomes is already in place. With the findings in this analysis in hand,
policymakers who wish to introduce incentive-based policies to improve principal quality
can better evaluate policy proposals.
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Evaluation Focused on Process
Principal performance evaluation methods focused on process tend to have at
their core a value that the principal should be an active participant in the evaluation
process. For advocates of evaluation methods focused on process, the primary aim of
evaluation is to promote learning and improving. Although not exclusively formative,
evaluation methods focused on process are designed to promote reflective practice. In
this section, I present research about three methods of principal evaluation that are
focused on practice. For each, I provide a definition and then summarize its underlying
principles.
Portfolios
Strong advocates for the use of the principal portfolio as an evaluation tool,
Brown and Irby (1997) define the portfolio as “a collection of thoughtfully selected
exhibits or artifacts and reflections indicative of an individual’s experiences and ability to
lead and of the individual’s progress toward and/or attainment of established goals or
criteria” (p. 2). The portfolio is often organized around the ISLLC or National
Association for Elementary School Principals (NAESP) standards (Green, 2004). ISLLC
standards define the characteristics and behaviors of school principals. Standard one is
“A school administrator is an educational leader who promotes the success of all students
by facilitating the development, articulation, implementation, and stewardship of a vision
of learning that is shared and supported by the school community” (Missouri Professors
of Education Administration). In constructing the portfolio, principals include narratives
of self-reflection, and supporters of using the portfolio in principal evaluation posit that
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the portfolio is most helpful because of its ability to promote self-assessment and
reflection (Brown and Irby, 1997; Green, 2004).
Among the four potential uses of the principal portfolio, Brown and Irby (1997)
include its suitability for summative evaluation. They argue that when districts use the
portfolio evaluation method principals feel as though evaluation is done “to them rather
than for or with them” (p. 5). Brown and Irby add that portfolio evaluation systems
contribute to improved communication between principals and their supervisors and
allow for principals to demonstrate evidence of their success in a wide variety of
responsibility areas. Brown and Irby (1997) explain that principals include goals
statements which demonstrate to the evaluator that the principal identifies organizational
needs and has a plan for accomplishing those objectives. According to Brown and Irby
(1997), the goals portion “is the heart of the portfolio,” and the accompanying
documentation of accomplishments “provides critical information to the reviewer
regarding the abilities, professionalism, and character of the principal” (p. 19).
Few studies measure the effectiveness of any of the various evaluation methods.
In one isolated qualitative study, Johnston and Thomas (2005) described the experience
of principals involved in a pilot project of a state-wide portfolio evaluation system for
new principals in Ohio from 1999-2002. Ohio was one of five states that participated in
this test of the Portfolio Assessment for School Leaders, a performance-based evaluation
system designed by the ISLLC and the Educational Testing Service (ETS). The six
ISLLC standards formed the basis of the portfolio. The portfolios created in the pilot
project from the participants in the five pilot states were to be used by ETS to produce
scoring norms. Johnston and Thomas (2005) divided study participants into three groups
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based on whether they found the portfolio process helpful or burdensome. The authors
ultimately concluded that portfolios can be useful for guiding professional development if
they are implemented as a part of a larger professional development program. They
suggested that the extra work to create a portfolio is only justified if states are interested
in producing evidence that principals exceed minimum competency standards.
Rating Scales
The use of rating scales is another method for principal evaluation that is
primarily focused on principal processes and characteristics, rather than outcomes. The
rating instruments often list domains – such as communication – which have a number of
competencies listed under each, on which the supervisor scores the principal on a Likert
scale. These scales are often constructed with reference to the standards of ISLLC and
NAESP.
Green (2004) describes as the use of rating scales as the most “popular” method.
Notwithstanding the fact that the data supporting this claim come from another study
(Green, 2002) which merely surveyed participants in a Southern California education
administration program and their colleagues at local schools, it is safe to say that rating
scales are currently in use in public schools. As Green indicates, this traditional
evaluation process involves a pre-evaluation conference in which the supervisor shares
the rating form and the rating criteria. Then supervisors collect performance indicators
and report those findings to the principal in a post-evaluation conference. Often
principals also fill out a self-evaluation form to facilitate the post-evaluation conference.
360-degree Evaluation
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With the 360-degree evaluation approach, a principal’s evaluation is based on the
assessments by representatives from all of the stakeholder groups that he or she must
serve. As Manatt (2000) notes, “360-feedback can be used at three levels: 1) for
developmental purposes (for the employee’s eyes only), 2) for appraisal and 3) for
compensation” (p. 2). Manatt (2000) adds that this evaluation technique can help to
facilitate communication between leaders and their constituents.
Dyer (2001) explains that the value of using 360-degree evaluation – also called
multi-rater feedback and full-circle evaluation – is that principals can learn from others
whether their actions are being perceived as intended. Dyer (2001) adds that getting
feedback from multiple viewpoints is more fair and comprehensive than using a single
supervisor rating. She explains that the survey instruments and questionnaires for this
model of evaluation solicit feedback from a leader’s constituents regarding behaviors and
skills such as delegating and communicating.
Objecting to the practice of using of 360-evaluation for summative evaluation,
Dyer asserts that supervisors should select this evaluation model as a way to help
principals develop as leaders. McCauley and Moxley (1996) go further in advocating that
360-evaluation should be a tool of formative evaluation. They explain, “One of our fears
is that 360-feedback will be seen as the developmental event rather than as a potential
unfreezing event that opens the individual to a developmental process” (p. 18). Thus,
these researchers are most concerned with using this model of evaluation in the
development of reflective leaders.
Evaluation Focused on Outcomes
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In contrast to evaluation methods focused on process, models for evaluating
principals based on outcomes are intended to focus principals and the entire school
organization on the results that the school is attempting to achieve. The underlying
principle of measuring principal performance by outcomes is that how results are
achieved is less important whether or not they are achieved. In this section, I describe
evaluation methods focused on outcomes and present the theoretical arguments both for
and against their use.
Among the sources that can be used in outcome-focused evaluations are data on
student safety, student dropout rates, student attendance, student graduation rates, and
student achievement test scores (Hoy and Miskel, 2001). Decisions regarding the
appropriateness of possible data sources depend on the outcomes that school boards and
other policymakers decide matter most. Given that the thrust of the current accountability
movement is a focus on student academic achievement on standardized tests, there is a
growing trend for policymakers to consider changes to traditional process-based
evaluation of school principals.
Models of principal evaluation based on outcomes can also be classified as
“management by objectives” models (Hoy and Miskel, 2001; Green 2004). These model
attempt to focus principal behavior on attaining certain preset outcomes, such as distinct
student achievement test score gains, by providing incentives for attaining predetermined
goals (Hoy and Miskel, 2001). Green (2004) writes that in this model “The professional
knowledge and skills that the principal will use to meet the objective are not discounted,
but they are merely a means to the end” (p. 23). Using slightly different terminology,
Hogan, Curphy, and Hogan (1994) refer to outcomes-based evaluation as measuring a
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leader by the “actual performance of [his or her] team or organizational unit” (p. 7). One
of the primary merits of evaluation focused on outcomes rests in the objectivity of using
results-based criteria, which are, as Slaughter (1989) notes, “much less ambiguous than a
description of how someone behaved” (p. 58).
Although the above authors (e.g. Slaughter, 1989; Hogan, Curphy, and Hogan,
1994; Green, 2004; Hoy and Miskel, 2001) note that evaluation based on outcomes has
the advantage of offering clear expectations and definitive performance measures, these
researchers also suggest potential drawbacks to these methods. Hogan and colleagues
explain that the largest threat to the validity of measuring a leader by the organization’s
performance is that the criteria used will be “contaminated.” In other words, they are
concerned that leaders will be held responsible for outcomes that may be affected by
events beyond their control. Green (2004) suggests that this approach can lead to
undesirable unintended consequences, such as focusing on superficial short-term, rather
than meaningful long-term goals. Hoy and Miskel (2001) suggest that this approach is
problematic for evaluating principals because it reflects a top down management
structure, which depends on a more tightly coupled organizational setting than is found in
public education. Slaughter (1989) notes that the objection to results-based principal
evaluation is that it assumes first that principals are capable of impacting school
outcomes and second that they have the freedom to do so.
Ediger (2002) expands on these objections by listing ten perceived problems
associated with measuring principal performance by student test scores. Among these
objections is his argument that state-mandated standardized tests fail to capture “student
achievement results from daily class work throughout a school year” (p. 90). Second,
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they focus on too narrow a set of Gardner’s multiple intelligences. Third, students do not
consider test items to be relevant or important. Ediger concludes by noting that it may not
be fair to measure principals by student test scores because of their “not having that much
influence over teachers to raise student test scores, [and] not having adequate time to
work with the curriculum due to many other tasks involved in school administration” (p.
91).
Indeed, an evaluation system that holds principals accountable for student
achievement would not be fair if principals are simply incapable of impacting student’s
academic performance. It is for this reason that I presented a summary of research that
refutes this claim in Chapter Two. The argument that principals can impact student
academic performance is critical for crafting incentive pay policies for improving
principal quality. Moreover, the above discussion of school principal performance
evaluation connects principal agent theory to the practical policy discussion because it
helps to minimize monitoring problems and information asymmetry that lead to agency
costs.
Principal Evaluation in Arkansas
The methods for principal evaluation are not standardized in Arkansas. That is,
local districts can determine the instruments to be used, the personnel who will
participate in conducting evaluations, and the frequency of these performance
assessments. At the very least, principals must be evaluated annually, as they hold and
must maintain their teaching licenses.
Principals, like certified teachers, must complete 60 hours of professional
development each year to maintain their teaching licenses (Rules, 2005). Each principal
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must complete an individual professional development plan which documents how he/she
will satisfy annual training requirements. These requirements include a minimum of three
hours of professional development in developing relationships with parents and
promoting parental involvement (Rules, 2005). In addition, principals must complete six
hours of technology training annually. The other hours of professional development
should be tailored to address an individual principal’s needs but should generally be
focused around the topics of data disaggregation, instructional leadership, and fiscal
management. Each district must verify and report principals’ completion of these
requirements annually to the Arkansas Department of Education through the Arkansas
Comprehensive School Improvement Plan. State funding is available for approved
professional development activities. Additionally, federal No Child Left Behind Title II
funds associated with teacher and principal quality may be used to pay for principal
professional development.
Comparison of Administrator Pay in Arkansas to Other States
In this final section of Chapter Three, I present descriptive data regarding
administrator pay trends across the state and region to provide context for the study’s
original findings in Chapter Five. National salary data for school principals was collected
online from the website of the United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). The most current information is the 2007 wage data, which was released
in May 2008. For this question, I also gathered information about the other 16 Southern
Regional Education Board States from the SREB website. Arkansas is a member of the
organization, which is a non-profit group that works to improve public education.
Comparisons among these member states can provide a regional context for
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understanding the level of principal wages in Arkansas. These data on principal wage
variation across the state of Arkansas were also gathered from the BLS website. I
selected the metropolitan service areas and report the most current wage information
below.
Arkansas’s 246 school districts employed 2,180 elementary and secondary
education administrators in 2007. The annual mean salary for the state’s administrators
was $68,000, compared to the national average mean wage of $77,612. This figure ranks
Arkansas 42nd nationally of 51 states and Washington, DC. The annual median salary for
Arkansas education administrators in elementary and secondary schools was $68,130,
which ranks the state 41st. The national median wage was $77,880.
The data in Table 3.2 show that, compared to six bordering states, the mean wage
for Arkansas administrators of $68,000 ranked the state 3rd and above the average mean
wage of $66,410. Arkansas’s median wage for administrators of $68,130 ranked the state
3rd and above the average median wage of $66,587.
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Table 3.2: Comparison of Wage Data for Arkansas K-12 Education Administrators
With Neighboring States

State
Missouri
Texas
Arkansas
Mississippi
Tennessee
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Average

Number
Employed
4450
18940
2180
2190
3640
3390
2890

Annual
Mean
Wage
$72,060
$68,110
$68,000
$67,740
$67,220
$61,030
$60,710
$66,410

Mean
Wage
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Annual
Median
Wage
$73,500
$67,120
$68,130
$68,530
$68,120
$60,560
$60,150
$66,587

Median
Wage
Rank
1
5
3
2
4
6
7

Data from Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data from May 2007 released May 2008.

As compared to that of the 16 Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) states,
Arkansas’s mean wage of $68,000 ranked the state 11th and was below this group’s
average mean wage of $72,359. In comparisons of the annual median wage with SREB
states (Table 3.3), Arkansas ranked 10th with $68,130 and was below the group’s average
median wage of $72,318.
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Table 3.3: Comparison of Wage Data for Arkansas K-12 Education Administrators with
SREB States
Annual
Mean
Annual
Median
Number
Mean
Wage
Median
Wage
State
Employed
Wage
Rank
Wage
Rank
Delaware
530
$98,220
1
$100,350
1
Maryland
5080
$88,650
2
$89,440
2
Florida
6620
$82,480
3
$82,010
3
Virginia
5980
$79,570
4
$78,040
5
Georgia
6910
$78,730
5
$79,850
4
Kentucky
3490
$72,670
6
$72,470
6
South Carolina
3160
$70,940
7
$70,690
7
Alabama
2960
$68,970
8
$69,190
8
Tennessee
3640
$68,120
9
$67,220
11
Texas
18940
$68,110
10
$67,120
12
Arkansas
2180
$68,000
11
$68,130
10
Mississippi
2190
$67,740
12
$68,530
9
North Carolina
8340
$66,060
13
$63,710
13
Louisiana
3390
$61,030
14
$60,560
14
Oklahoma
2890
$60,710
15
$60,150
15
West Virginia
1870
$57,750
16
$59,630
16
Average
$ 72,359
$ 72,318
Data from Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data from May 2007 released May 2008.
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Administrator Pay Trends across the State of Arkansas
In both metropolitan- and non-metropolitan regions across the state (Table 3.4),
average wages for elementary and secondary education administrators range from
$62,860 to $72,890. The average mean wage for these twelve regions was $66,766. Of
course, this figure is lower than the state average of $68,000.

Table 3.4: Comparison of Arkansas K-12 Education Administrators by Metropolitan
Service Area
Area name

Number
Employed

Annual
Mean
Wage

Mean
Wage
Rank

Annual
Median
Wage

Median
Wage
Rank

Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, ARMO
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR

280

$72,890

1

$72,650

1

500

$70,360

2

$71,590

2

Fort Smith, AR-OK

220

$68,170

3

$68,020

5

Jonesboro, AR

100

$67,770

4

$67,550

6

Hot Springs, AR

60

$67,590

5

$69,460

4

Memphis, TN-MS-AR
Central Arkansas nonmetropolitan
area
South Arkansas nonmetropolitan area

840

$67,530

6

$70,010

3

190

$66,760

7

$66,520

7

320

$64,770

8

$64,620

10

East Arkansas nonmetropolitan area

280

$64,720

9

$64,790

9

West Arkansas nonmetropolitan area

160

$64,240

10

$65,240

8

Pine Bluff, AR

110

$63,530

11

$59,970

12

Texarkana-Texarkana, TX-AR

100

$62,860

12

$61,480

11

Average

$66,766

$66,825

Data from Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data from May 2007 released May 2008.

Chapter Three Summary
As policymakers are turning their focus to improving principal performance, they
must choose how they will evaluate the effectiveness of these critically important school
leaders. The current literature about measuring the effectiveness of school principals can
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be characterized in two main categories. The first approach to principal evaluation
focuses on judging principals’ characteristics and behaviors. These process evaluations
use the following three methods: the principal portfolio, the rating scale, and the 360degree evaluation. The second approach centers on the concept that principals should be
measured by the results that their organizations produce, such as student achievement test
scores. At the heart of the debate over the appropriateness of evaluating principals based
on outcomes is an assumption that principals can actually impact student performance. In
Chapter Two, I presented the findings of critical syntheses and meta-analyses which
suggest that, whether through direct or indirect means, principals can in fact play a
critical role in improving student outcomes.
In the final section of this chapter, I presented descriptive data on administrator
salaries in various regions of the state and regionally. Arkansas administrators are paid
relatively lower salaries among the SREB states and about average among neighboring
states. The summary salary data, which demonstrate the variation in pay that exists across
regions of the state, show that principals in the northwest corner of the state and in Little
Rock have higher salaries than those in the other regions of the state. These data provide
context for the study’s original findings on principal pay, which are reported in Chapter
Five.

58

Chapter 4: Data and Methods
In this chapter, I present the data and methods used in the analysis of the study’s
two main research questions. The first question investigates which factors influence the
level of a principal’s pay. I consider the characteristics of principals themselves – such as
their experience and degree level – and the characteristics of the populations served –
including the school and district size, racial makeup, and poverty level. For question one,
I run two alternate models that include cross-sectional school level academic
performance information from the prior year. The findings from this first line of inquiry
will also include information about principal sorting across different populations. The
complete findings of research question one, which is primarily exploratory in nature, will
be informative for policymakers inquiring about what factors drive differences in the
levels of principal pay and about the settings in which higher paid, better credentialed,
and more experienced principals are serving.
The second question involves an investigation of whether a principal’s
performance – as measured by student academic test performance – impacts changes in a
principal’s salary. This question is an important aspect of the study because the answer
will inform the study’s primary policy recommendations. Understanding whether more
effective principals get higher increases in pay can inform policymakers about the
incentives that currently exist in the principal labor market and can guide their policy
reform decisions about how to improve principal quality.
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Research Question One: Factors Influencing the Level of Principal Pay
The first research question is: To what extent is the level of principal pay
impacted by observable characteristics of the populations they serve and of principals
themselves, including their performance in the prior year?
The answer to this question will indicate whether are there systematic variations
in salary according to principals’ observable characteristics and those of the populations
they serve. This question addresses the need for policymakers to have a comprehensive
understanding of the factors that drive variations in principal pay. These potential
patterns of variation may have implications for policy, as the sorting of higher paid – and
therefore potentially higher quality – principals among certain groups of students may be
contributing to educational inequities across the state. Before designing policy solutions
to ameliorate potential educational inequities, policymakers would benefit from a clear
understanding of the principal pay and quality landscape and the nature of any patterns of
principal sorting.
The first line of investigation for research question one involves a descriptive
analysis to discern sorting patterns of principals by their own characteristics and the
characteristics of the populations they serve. This descriptive analysis does not control
for the factors that drive differences in pay, but merely portrays the reality of which types
of principals are serving which types of student populations. The question may be
instructive for policymakers who are considering differential pay incentives to change
principal sorting patterns.
Thus, research question one includes two subquestions. The first subquestion is:
How are principals sorted among different student populations with regard to their own
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observable characteristics and the observable characteristics of the student populations
they serve? That is, without holding constant the factors that impact principal salaries, are
principals of, for example, high poverty districts and schools currently making lower
salaries than those in low poverty districts and schools? Similarly, how do other school
and district characteristics, such as size of enrollment or percentage of the population that
is minority, impact the level of a principal’s pay?
The second subquestion for research question one is: When controlling for
various independent factors that impact the level of principal pay, which factors drive the
differences in principal salaries? For example, are principals of high minority schools
and/or districts, small schools and/or districts, or high poverty schools and/or districts
paid less, when holding all other factors – such as their own experience or degree level –
equal?
Data for Research Question One
Principal Salary Data
The data set of Arkansas principals was collected from the Arkansas Department
of Education. The strengths of the data set are that it contains a large sample size with
salary, demographic, work experience, and educational background information for each
individual. Principals and assistant principals from all public schools K-12, excluding
charter schools, were included for the school years from 2004-05 through 2007-08.
Although this data set had holes, I was able to collect a large portion of the missing
information by making email and telephone inquiries to district personnel across the
state. In addition, I searched district websites for information about some principals’
subsequent career choices and salary figures.
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The data set’s shortcomings did present some challenges. Principals are not
identified with a unique identifier; therefore, combining data sets over multiple years
involved creating matches on principals by name. Potential uncertainty created by
duplicate names was settled by examining other information in the individual entries. The
largest challenge occurred after combining data sets over a two-year period. After
identifying which principals moved from their current position, those “movers” fell into
two main categories. The first category of movers includes those who stayed in the data
set. Members of this first category either switched to a new position as a principal or
assistant principal. The second category of movers includes those who left the data set
altogether. To fill in this missing data, I sent approximately 250 email requests to
superintendents in the districts where those principals had served to determine the
successive career choice for each principal who left the data set. I also searched online to
find missing employment and salary data for some former principals for whom I did not
receive an email response. Across the three combined data subsets (e.g. 2004-05 and
2005-06 formed one subset), 450 principals were missing; I received information on the
successive career choices for 187. I was interested to determine the successive career
choice so that I could include an estimate of salary for that individual, where possible.
To assess secondary analysis of principal career choices, I collected data about the
following successive career choice categories:
1) Went back to being a classroom teacher;
2) Moved to a central office position;
3) Retired;
4) Left the education profession, but did not retire;
5) Went back to school full time;
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6) Deceased; or
7) Unknown.
Additionally, in filling missing data and making salary estimates, the following criteria
were applied:
•

For those individuals who went back to being a classroom teacher, I entered a
salary estimate based on the salary schedule in that district, given the teacher’s
experience and degree.

•

For those who moved to a central office position, I found salary figures for some
former principals online. However, for most of these individuals, I did not locate a
salary figure. They were removed from the data set for the primary analyses.

•

Just as with the central office personnel for whom I was unable to locate a salary
figure, I dropped from the analysis sample the individuals who left the education
profession, who went back to school full-time, who were deceased, or unknown.

•

Combining records with a lack of information about successive choices, those for
whom I could not make an accurate salary estimate, and those with missing data
within the individual record, the total data attrition rate was 20.1%.

District and School Poverty Levels, Extent of Minority Population, and District and
School Size Data
Data for the various analyses regarding district and school poverty levels, the
extent of the district and school minority populations, and district and school size data
were collected from the Arkansas Department of Education Statewide Information
System for all relevant years
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Data on Former Principal Career Choices
To collect this information, I assembled a list of Arkansas school principals who
left the data set entirely from year to year. I then emailed the superintendents of each
district to gather data on the career choices of those who left the district. I received
responses from 187 of 450.
Principal Performance Data
To analyze how principal salaries might be affected by principal performance, it
was necessary to select a performance variable. Because the principal is the chief
executive of the school, I used school-wide performance information. Indeed, a
principal’s unit of responsibility is the school building, and the academic performance at
the school level one measure of his or her effectiveness.
The performance variable in the study’s primary analysis is based on the Arkansas
Comprehensive Testing Assessment and Accountability Program (ACTAAP) with regard
to No Child Left Behind and the measure of Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP). Although
the use of an AYP performance measure began nationally for Title I schools with the
1994 Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA) reauthorization of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) (Shields et al., 2004), AYP as it is calculated and
implemented currently in Arkansas was initiated in 2003 (Arkansas Department of
Education, 2008).
The goal of NCLB’s AYP measure is to for the state to ensure that 100 percent of
students will be proficient in mathematics and reading/language arts by 2013-2014 school
year (Arkansas Department of Education, 2008). In practice, this 100 percent proficiency
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goal of NCLB has led Arkansas to establish a performance baseline and have divided the
gap between 100 percent proficiency and the baseline into twelve annual proficiency
goals (Arkansas Department of Education, 2008). The baselines for each of the grade
levels (K-5, 6-8, and 9-12) are presented in the table below:
Table 4.2: Adequate Yearly Progress Baseline Percent Proficient for Literacy and
Mathematics by Subject
Annual
Baseline Percent
School
Gain
Level
Subject
Proficient
Needed to
(Grades)
(Revised 2006)
Meet AYP
K to 5
Literacy
42.4
7.20
K to 5
Mathematics
40.0
7.50
6 to 8
Literacy
35.2
8.10
6 to 8
Mathematics
29.1
8.86
9 to 12
Literacy
35.5
8.06
9 to 12
Mathematics
29.2
8.85
Data Source: Arkansas Department of Education (2008)

All Arkansas schools participate in this accountability program, which involves
annual testing scheduled at varying times during the school year. The current AYP
calculation system was adopted in for the 2007-2008 school year, but the testing and
AYP system that were in place during the testing time period of this study – testing years
2004-05 to 2006-07 – operated differently. During the time period of this study, to make
Adequate Yearly Progress, a school must have been above the percent proficient bar each
year in both Literacy and Mathematics (Arkansas Department of Education, 2008). The
percent proficiency was calculated as a three year average of the percent of students
scoring above a certain cut score on a given exam (Arkansas Department of Education,
2008). For example, if a K-5 school was at 60 percent proficient in Literacy in 2005-06
(based on the test scores for 2003-04, 2004-05, and 2005-06) and at 40 percent proficient
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in Mathematics, that school would have made AYP. That school would have been
designated as “Meets Standards” for the 2006-07 school year. On the 2006-07 testing in
Mathematics, the school would have needed for its new three-year-average percent
proficient average (based on testing in years 2004-05, 2005-06, and 2006-07) to reflect an
increase of 7.5 percent of its students scoring proficient to make AYP again. If that
school were to have maintained, or even declined, in the percent of its students who
scored proficient in Literacy, it would have continued to make AYP, provided the threeyear-average of the percent of students scoring proficient was above the proficiency bar
of 49.6.
Under both the older and current AYP systems, when a school fails to make AYP
for two consecutive years, it is designated as in “School Improvement”. Each year that
the school fails to meet AYP, the schools moves farther down the School Improvement
Status ladder. Each successive categorization of the School Improvement Status is to
result in increasingly stringent sanctions. The table below, adapted from Arkansas
Department of Education documents, lists the sanctions to be applied for failure to meet
AYP.
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Table 4.3: School Performance and Actions/Sanctions Associated with Varying Levels
of Improvement Status
School Performance

School Improvement Status
for the Following Year

First year a school’s
performance is below
AYP starting point or
first year a school or
school district fails to
make adequate yearly
progress.

Action/Sanction
Review school
improvement plan and
establish professional
development needs for
faculty and staff

Second year of a
school’s failure to
make AYP.

School Improvement Status
(Year 1)

Third year of a
school’s failure to
make AYP

School Improvement Status
(Year 2)

Fourth year of a
school’s failure to
make AYP

School enters corrective action
status (Year 3)

Fifth year of a school’s
Reconstruction status
failure to make AYP.
(Year 4)

School must provide
choice option for
students to attend
another school in the
district not in
improvement. May, at
the option of the
school/district offer
supplemental services if
choice is not an option.
School must continue to
provide choice and add
the option of
supplemental services to
students who qualify.
The State is required to
establish and implement
a plan of corrective
action
The State is required to
act to restructure the
identified school.

Although the designation of meeting or failing AYP may be considered a poor
measure of school quality for a variety of reasons, I chose it as a measure of principal
performance because it is an accepted, publicly reported signal of school quality per
federal law. It is conceivable that superintendents and school boards involved in school
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principal hiring decisions might judge the quality of a school, and therefore its principal,
by whether or not the school made AYP.
I did, however, use a second measure of school performance in addition to the
AYP designation as a principal performance variable. The second performance variable
included in this study was a combined percent proficient and advanced variable on math
and language on state academic assessments for the school in which the principal served
in the prior year. This percent proficient variable was primarily chosen because it has a
more continuous quality, ranging from 0 to 100. Again, it is plausible that
superintendents and school boards involved in school principal hiring decisions might
judge the quality of a school, and therefore its principal, by whether or not the school had
a high percentage of students at the level of proficient or above. It is true that both
performance measures – AYP and percent proficient – do not take into account the fact
that principals may be serving different types of student populations. These absolute
measures are, however, the publicly reported and readily available measures of school
performance.
Methods for Question One
This analysis is designed to determine the relative impact that various factors have
on differences in the level of principal pay. For examples, the factors that might be
expected to lead to variations in principal pay may include: a principal’s experience,
degree level, district or school size, district or school wealth, district or school minority
percentage, and school level – elementary, middle, and high. To estimate the relative
magnitude and significance of these potential factors, I conducted three different analyses
using OLS regression. The primary difference is that the first equation does not include
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performance data from the prior year. The second and third equations differ in the type of
performance data used. The equations are below. Variables included in these models are
informed by the previous related studies (Cullen and Mazzeo, 2008; Goldhaber, 2007) of
principal pay. Some of the differences in the models below and those in previous studies
concern data limitations.
Question One – Model 1 (No performance data included)
Ysalary t = β0 + β1middle + β2high + β3degreeBA + β4degreespecialist +
β5degreedoctorate + β6experience + β7districtsize + β8districtpoverty +
β9districtminority + β10districtwealth + β11schoolsize + β12schoolpoverty +
β13schoolminority + β14female + β15principalminority + β16_year2006-07 +
β17_year2007-08 + e
Question One – Model 2 (Includes AYP performance data)
Ysalary t = β0 + β1middle + β2high + β3degreeBA + β4degreespecialist +
β5degreedoctorate + β6experience + β7districtsize + β8districtpoverty +
β9districtminority + β10districtwealth + β11schoolsize + β12schoolpoverty
+ β13schoolminority + β14female + β15principalminority + β16_year200607 + β17_year2007-08 + β18meetstandards t-1 + e
Question One – Model 3 (Includes Percent Proficient/Advanced)
Ysalary t = β0 + β1middle + β2high + β3degreeBA + β4degreespecialist +
β5degreedoctorate + β6experience + β7districtsize + β8districtpoverty +
β9districtminority + β10districtwealth + β11schoolsize + β12schoolpoverty +
β13schoolminority + β14female + β15principalminority + β16_year2006-07 +
β17_year2007-08 + β18percentproficient t-1 + e
Table 4.1: Research Question One Variables and Variable Descriptions
Variable Name
Variable Description
The dependent variable in this equation is a
principal’s salary in dollars in a given year 2005-06,
Salaryt
2006-07, or 2007-08.
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β0

This is a constant. It represents the average salary in
dollars earned by a male, elementary principal during
the 2004-05 school year, with a master’s degree, zero
years of experience, a district population of zero
students, and a district Free and Reduced Lunch
population of zero.

Middle and high

These are school level variables, and elementary is
the omitted category. The coefficients on these
dummy variables represent the return to a principal in
dollars of salary for working in a middle or high
school relative to working in an elementary school,
holding all else constant.

degreeBA, degreespecialist,
and degreedoctorate

These are principal degree levels, and degreeMA is
the omitted category. The coefficient on these dummy
variables represent the salary increases in dollars that
are attributable to having a BA, specialist, or
doctorate degree, as compared to having a master’s
degree, holding all else constant.

Experience

The coefficient on this continuous variable relates the
marginal increase in salary due to annual increase in
experience on the job, holding all else constant.

districtsize and schoolsize

These continuous variables relate the marginal
increase in salary due to a single student increase in a
district or school enrollment, holding all else constant.

districtpoverty and
schoolpoverty

These variables range from 0 to 100 as a percent and
represent the variation in salary that is due to a
marginal increase in the percent of students in a
district or school that are eligible for Free or Reduced
Lunch, holding all else constant.

Districtwealth

This variable ranges from 0 to 1, where larger values
represent higher district wealth. This variable is a
state figure used in facilities funding, and it represents
the revenues raised based on the local tax base.
Specifically, it is defined as the result of one (1)
minus the ratio of local revenue per student divided
by the difference between foundation funding and
local revenue per student.
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Districtminority and
schoolminority

These variables range from 0 to 100 as a percent and
represent the variation in salary that is due to a
marginal increase in the percent of students in a
district or school that are non-white, holding all else
constant.

Female

This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for
principals who are female. The coefficient on this
indicator variable represents any variation in salary
that may be systematically related to a principal’s sex,
holding all else constant.

Principalminority

This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for
principals who are non-white. The coefficient on this
indicator variable represents any variation in salary
that may be systematically related to a principal’s
being non-white, holding all else constant.

year2005-06, year2006-07,
and year2007-08

meetstandards

E

The coefficient on this performance variable relates to
the dollar difference in level of salary that is
attributable to meeting performance standards (i.e.
meeting AYP) on the state academic performance
assessments at the school level. A positive and
significant coefficient indicates that principals of
schools that meet standards receive a larger salary as
a result of their performance that is over and above
what is earned on average simply by staying on the
job for another year, holding all else constant.

t-1

percentproficient

These are year dummy variables, for which the
coefficients represent the dollar differences in salary
that exist each year relative to the salary in year
2004-05, holding all else constant.

t-1

This performance variable is an average of the
percent proficient or advanced in reading and math on
the state academic performance assessments at the
school level in year t-1. The coefficient on this
variable equals the dollar salary increase that
corresponds to a one percent increase in school
proficiency on the state assessment, holding all else
constant.
The error term represents any source of variation in
salary that is not accounted for by the independent
variables included in the model.
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Summary of Analytic Strategy for Question One
As a first step in the study’s analysis, I explore how principals with varying
characteristics are sorted among the districts and schools of Arkansas, without holding
constant variables that can impact the level of principal pay. I divide the schools and
districts into various groups (quintiles) based on their characteristics (percent FRL,
percent minority, percent, etc). I also present basic principal sorting and pay patterns by
school level (elementary, middle, high).
These basic statistics tell whether principals in certain settings tend to have higher
pay, experience, or degree level. The fact that higher paid principals are in, for example,
larger districts may have to do with the fact that the larger districts pay better, or it could
be due to their being more experienced and better trained. For this reason, I then conduct
the regression analysis to determine what factors are actually driving the differences in
pay. Any differences between the analysis of principal pay with and without controls for
the various factors that impact pay will be informative for policymakers, who wish to
provide incentives to motivate certain changes in principal behaviors. After conducting
the combined sample analyses, I then conduct subgroup analyses by school level.

Research Question Two: Factors Influencing Changes in Principal Pay
The second research question is: To what extent does a principal’s performance in
the prior year impact the magnitude of the change in his or her salary?
This second research question involves a direct investigation of whether a
principal’s performance impacts changes in a principal’s salary. This question is
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measured by examining the school level academic performance on state-mandated
standardized tests of a principal’s school in the prior year. The reason that I use building
level academic performance data is because the principal’s unit of assignment is the
school. The significance of this question is that it provides a better understanding of
whether more effective principals get higher increases in pay. These findings can inform
policymakers about the incentives that currently exist in the principal labor market and
can guide their policy reform decisions about how to improve principal quality.
Data for Research Question Two
Principal Performance Data
To analyze how changes in principal salaries might be affected by principal
performance, it was necessary to select a performance variable. Because the principal is
the chief executive of the school, I used school-wide performance information, as in
question one. Indeed, a principal’s unit of responsibility is the school building, and the
academic performance at the school level one measure of his or her effectiveness.
Principal Salary Data
The principal salary data used for this research question is described above under
research question one.
Methods for Research Question Two
To investigate the existence and magnitude of the relationship between increases
and salary and school performance, I conducted three separate analyses. First, I regressed
the salary in a successive year on the prior year salary, a school performance variable,
and indicator variables for change in degree. The model intentionally excludes anything
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that might be related to earning a higher salary as a result of better performance. That is,
the model is allowing for high performing principals to sort themselves into higher
paying jobs in better paying districts or to move to higher paying jobs, such as the
superintendency or a spot in a bigger school district. As the preliminary descriptive
analysis indicates, for example, there may returns to working in a larger district or at
various school levels (elementary, middle, high). Second, I dropped out the change in
degree variables to determine if these variables have a practical impact the coefficients.
Third, I changed the performance variable from “meets standards,” a dichotomous AYP
measure, to a more continuous variable, a measure of proficiency on state academic
assessments. The equations are below, and as with question one described above, the
inclusion of control variables is informed by previous studies cited in Chapter Two.
Question Two - Model 1 (AYP performance and change in degree)
Ysalary t = β0 + β1salary t-1 + β2meets_standards t-1 + β3earn_specialist t-1 +
earn_doctorate t-1 + βyear2006-07 + βyear2007-08 + e
Question Two – Model 2 (AYP performance; no change in degree)
Ysalary t = β0 + β1salary t-1 + β2meets_standards t-1 + βyear2006-07 + βyear2007-08 +
e
Question Two – Model 3 (percent proficient/advanced; no change in degree)
Ysalary t = β0 + β1salary t-1 + β2percentprof t-1 + β3year2006-07 + β4year2007-08 + e

Table 4.4: Research Question Two Variables and Variable Descriptions
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Variable Name

Variable Description
This is the salary in dollars earned by a principal or
former principal in one of three school years: 2005-06,
2006-2007, or 2007-08.

salary t
Β0

This is a constant. It represents the average salary for all
principals in time t-1.
The is a principal’s salary in dollars in time t-1. The
coefficient on this variable represents a portion of the
change in an individual’s salary between times t and t-1
that is dependent on the magnitude of the salary in time
t-1,holding all other factors constant.

salary t-1

This a dummy variable that equals 1 when a principal
earns a specialist degree in time t-1. The coefficient on
this variable represents the return in dollars of salary in
year t when a principal moving from a master’s degree to
a specialist degree. This change variable is included in
the model because any increase in salary that is due to a
difference in degree is unrelated to the potential return to
meeting performance standards, holding all else constant.
This a dummy variable that equals 1 when a principal
earns a doctorate degree in time t-1. The coefficient on
this variable represents the return in dollars of salary in
year t when a principal moving from a specialist degree
to a doctorate degree. This change variable is included in
the model because any increase in salary that is due to a
difference in degree is unrelated to the potential return to
meeting performance standards, holding all else constant.

earn_specialist

earn_doctorate

meets_standards

percentprof

t-1

t-1

The coefficient on this performance variable relates to
the dollar change in salary that is attributable to meeting
performance standards (i.e. meeting AYP) on the state
academic performance assessments at the school level. A
positive and significant coefficient indicates that
principals of schools that meet standards receive an
increase in salary as a result, that is over and above what
is earned on average simply by staying on the job for
another year, holding all else constant.
This performance variable is an average of the percent
proficient or advanced in reading and math on the state
academic performance assessments at the school level in
year t-1. The coefficient on this variable equals the dollar
salary increase that corresponds to a one percent increase
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in school proficiency on the state assessment, holding all
else constant.

year2006-07 and
year2007-08

These dummy variables are included to account for the
average change in pay that occurs annually which is
unrelated to performance. The coefficients represent
dollar increases in salary simply for being a principal in
the following year, holding all else constant. The omitted
category is year2005-06.

E

This error term includes the unmeasured sources of
variation not accounted for by the independent variables
included in the model.

Chapter Four Summary
As a first step in the study’s analysis, I explore pay patterns for principals with
varying characteristics and how these principals are distributed among the districts and
schools of Arkansas, without holding constant variables that can impact the level of
principal pay. This descriptive analysis involves comparisons of principal groupings
based on principal characteristics and the characteristics of the populations served. These
basic statistics tell whether principals in certain settings tend to have higher pay,
experience, or degree level. The fact that higher paid principals are in, for example,
larger districts may have to do with the fact that the larger districts pay better, or it could
be due to their being more experienced and better trained. For this reason, I then conduct
the regression analysis to determine what factors are actually driving the differences in
pay. Any differences between the analysis of principal pay with and without controls for
the various factors that impact pay will be informative for policymakers, who wish to
provide incentives to motivate certain changes in principal behaviors.
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Next, to investigate the existence and magnitude of the relationship between
increases and salary and school performance, I conduct three separate analyses. First, I
regress the salary in a successive year on the prior year salary, a school performance
variable, and indicator variables for change in degree. The model intentionally excludes
anything that might be related to earning a higher salary as a result of better performance.
That is, the model is allowing for high performing principals to sort themselves into
higher paying jobs in better paying districts or to move to higher paying jobs, such as the
superintendency or a spot in a bigger school district.
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Chapter 5: Findings
In this chapter I present the findings for the two primary research questions.
Research question one is: To what extent is the level of principal pay impacted by
observable characteristics of the populations they serve and of principals themselves,
including their performance in the prior year? Additionally, because there may be
patterns in the performance variables at each of the three school levels, I analyzed
principal subgroups by school level. Alongside the findings for question one, I present
descriptive analysis of principal pay patterns across different school types based on the
pay incentives that exist in the labor market. In the final part of the chapter, I present the
findings of research question two: To what extent do current pay and evaluation policies
reward school principals for performance with increases in pay?
Findings of Research Question One: Factors Influencing the Level of Principal Pay
Table 5.1 below is a presentation of the complete findings for research question
one, which explores the factors that impact the level of a principal’s salary. After the
complete findings table, I divide the various independent variables into groups and
discuss the impact of each group separately. In each variable group discussion, I first
present descriptive information about principal pay patterns with reference to certain
district and school characteristics, and then I present data from the regression analysis to
investigate if there is a difference between the controlled and uncontrolled relationships
with the given variables and principal salaries.
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Table 5.1: Regression Coefficients for Question One – Factors that Impact the
Level of a Principal’s Salary from 2005-06 to 2007-08
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124)
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093)
Model 1
Model 3
(Percent
(No Performance
Model 2
Data)
(AYP Data) Proficient)
Variable
Experience (years)

160.20**
(21.15)

159.93**
(21.15)

158.31**
(21.25)

Female

-633.54
(401.22)

-638.89
(401.20)

-710.78
(405.30)

Principal Minority (non
white)

-905.10
(613.67)

-877.95
(613.98)

-689.18
(626.16)

BA

-4813.11*
(1506.88)

-4748.57*
(1507.58)

-4742.76*
(1507.25)

-----

-----

-----

Specialist

2619.09**
(467.86)

2613.92**
(467.83)

2656.32**
(470.68)

Doctorate

5321.44**
(935.91)

5389.72**
(937.38)

5258.16**
(950.45)

-----

-----

-----

Middle School

3575.33**
(496.51)

3668.60**
(501.97)

4016.51**
(514.21)

High School

4253.74**
(534.57)

4308.74**
(536.31)

4950.29**
(583.76)

.80**
(.04)

.80**
(.04)

.80**
(.04)

District _FRL%

-83.31*
(28.03)

-82.97*
(28.03)

-92.16**
(28.34)

District_Minority%

58.38*
(26.95)

58.79*
(26.95)

65.60*
(27.27)

District_Wealth

26.78*
(10.56)

26.34*
(10.57)

24.53*
(10.63)

School Enrollment

14.11**
(0.75)

14.25**
(.76)

14.01**
(.76)

School_FRL%

-3.97
(23.42)

-2.82
(23.43)

13.44
(24.05)

School_Minority%

-7.06
(24.84)

-4.27
(24.94)

-2.03
(25.37)

-----

-----

-----

MA (Omitted)

Elementary School (Omitted)

District Enrollment

Year 2005-06
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Year 2006-07

3357.48**
(429.42)

3362.59**
(429.39)

3152.76**
(441.89)

Year 2007-08

6237.82**
(432.60)

6253.60**
(432.74)

5746.59**
(462.77)

Meets_AYP

-----

606.54
(482.66)

-----

Average % proficient time t-1

-----

-----

44.78*
(15.42)

Intercept
N observations
R2

68,631.30**
(1,337.33)
2570
0.541

67,913.54** 65,468.37**
(1,54.06)
(1,715.44)
2570
2538
0.542
0.540

Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth,
and race variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year
indicator variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree,
Male, Year 2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05;
**Significant at p<0.01

Next, I present the regression coefficients for the subgroup analysis of Question
One, which is an examination of the extent to which various factors impact principal pay
by school level – elementary, middle, and high school. Here, I only present the
coefficients from Question One Model 3, which includes the percent proficient
performance variable, 2 for each subgroup and for the complete analysis sample. Model 3
includes the better performance variable. All three models for each subgroup are included
in Appendix C.

2

To explore the possibility that superintendents and school boards might also use change in percent
proficient as a crude growth measure as an indicator of principal performance, I ran the models for both
question 1 and question 2 including this performance variable. In these alternative models, principal
performance, as measured by change in percent proficient, did not have a statistically significant positive
impact either on the level of pay or the change in pay.
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Table 5.2: Regression Coefficients for Question One Analysis of School Level
Subgroups – Factors that Impact the Level of a Principal’s Salary from 2005-06
to 2007-08
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $86,000; SD $13,093)
Elementary
School
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)
139.20**
(28.74)

Middle
School
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)
57.45**
(0.19)

High
School
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)
267.05**
(44.36)

Combined
Sample
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)
158.31**
(21.25)

1.43
(525.07)

-1391.62
(751.63)

-1188.02
(1039.89)

-710.78
(405.30)

-1669.04*
(742.91)

1009.78
(1444.80)

1704.91
(1680.49)

-689.18
(626.16)

-5971.00**
(2249.50)
----2557.18**
(638.27)

-3619.42**
(2954.22)
----3995.10**
(864.41)

-4473.58
(2834.48)
----1560.28
(1094.73)

-4742.76*
(1507.25)
----2656.32**
(470.68)

6895.68**
(1338.32)

4664.68**
(1478.88)

3520.93
(2528.21)

5258.16**
(950.45)

District Enrollment

.74**
(.06)

.82**
(.10)

.76**
(.13)

.80**
(.04)

School Enrollment

13.01**
(.76)

17.18**
(2.11)

14.61**
(1.40)

14.01**
(.76)

District_Minority%

46.22
(30.45)

88.62
(81.82)

-39.67
(96.36)

65.60*
(27.27)

School_Minority%

7.87
(27.53)

7.12
(80.60)

86.91
(92.74)

-2.03
(25.37)

District _FRL%

-77.95*
(28.03)

-152.38**
(32.61)

-32.35
(82.46)

-92.16**
(28.34)

School_FRL%

-25.60
(26.20)

92.02
(76.65)

-54.61
(69.35)

13.44
(24.05)

District_Wealth

58.35**
(14.68)

.63
(21.27)

-25.27
(21.78)

24.53*
(10.63)

Elementary School
(Omitted)

-----

-----

-----

-----

Middle School

-----

-----

-----

4016.51**
(514.21)

High School

-----

-----

-----

4950.29**
(583.76)

Variable
Experience (years)
Female
Principal Minority (non
white)
BA
MA (Omitted)
Specialist
Doctorate
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Average % proficient time t1
Year 2005-06
Year 2006-07
Year 2007-08
Intercept
N observations
R2

45.37*
(19.49)
----2930.41**
(590.06)

109.71**
(40.23)
----3202.10**
(895.36)

8.48
(34.34)
----3584.80**
(928.88)

44.78*
(15.42)
----3152.76**
(441.89)

5236.24**
(629.64)

5677.85**
(975.76)

6670.35**
(932.69)

5746.59**
(462.77)

65, 984.14**
(2,291.14)
1341
0.523

65, 731.23**
(3,724.04)
508
0.620

69,819.54** 65,468.37**
(3,266)
(1,715.44)
697
2538
0.526
0.54

The Extent to Which Principal Characteristics Impact the Level of Principal Pay
The descriptive statistics below include information regarding principal
experience, sex, and minority status with respect to school level – elementary, middle,
and high school. These statistics provide information about principal pay patterns for
principals with varying characteristics relative to different school levels. I then compare
these descriptive findings to those from the question one regression analysis that focuses
on how a principal’s demographics impact the level of his or her pay, while holding
constant other observable factors that might influence the level of a principal’s salary.
Tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 show aspects of principal pay patterns among the three
levels of schooling based on selected principal characteristics for a three-year period from
2005-06 to 2007-08. Table 5.3 reveals two interesting patterns. First, there are
disproportionately more female principals serving in elementary grades, and second,
there is a small percentage of minority principals across all levels of schooling. The
largest percentage of minority principals can be found in elementary grades (17 percent
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non-white). The total percentage of minority principals across all grade levels for this
time frame was 14 percent.
Table 5.4 shows that very few principals at any level hold either bachelor’s or
doctorate degrees. Overwhelmingly, principals hold master’s degrees; the only real
source of variation in credential by grade level is that middle schools appear to be staffed
at a greater percentage (than either elementary or high schools) with principals holding
specialist degrees. Table 5.5 shows that there are relatively proportionate distributions of
principals holding various degrees across all levels of schools. For example, 52 percent of
all principals serve in elementary schools, and 53 percent of all principals with master’s
degrees serve in elementary schools. Again, middle schools are staffed with a
disproportionately higher share of principals with specialist and doctorate degrees.
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics of Principal Characteristics by
School Level from 2005-06 to 2007-08
School Level
Elementary Middle High Total
N Total
1341
512
717 2570
Average Experience (years)
23.57
22.52 21.9 22.89
Range Experience (years)
0-47
0-46
0-48 0-48
N Female
910
199
125 1234
Percent Female by Level
68%
39%
17% 48%
N Minority
236
68
60
364
Percent Minority by Level
18%
13%
8% 14%
Sample N = 2,570 is for all individuals with a complete record.
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Table 5.4: Number and Percent of Principals by Highest
Degree Level Attained from 2005-06 to 2007-08
School Level
Elementary Middle High Total
N Bachelor’s
15
8
13
36
Percent Bachelor's
1%
2%
2%
1%
N Master's
1046
341
575 1962
Percent Master's
78%
67%
80% 76%
N Specialist
235
127
110 472
Percent Specialist
18%
25%
15% 18%
N Doctorate
45
36
19
100
Percent Doctorate
3%
7%
3%
4%
Sample N = 2,570 is for all individuals with a complete record.

Table 5.5: Distribution of Principals with a Given Degree by School Level
from 2005-06 to 2007-08 Compared to that School Level’s Share of Total
Principals in the Data Set
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
School Level
Bachelor's Master's Specialist Doctorate Share of Total
Elementary
42%
53%
50%
45%
52%
Middle
22%
17%
27%
36%
20%
High
36%
29%
23%
19%
28%
TOTAL
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Sample N = 2,570 is for all individuals with a complete record

Table 5.6, which is the analysis of the combined sample, below shows that, as
with teacher pay, a principal’s own characteristics appear to impact his or her salary.
Principal pay is significantly affected by experience and degree level. For each year of
experience, a principal can expect to see a salary increase of approximately $160.
Further, principals with specialist and doctorate degrees tend to earn approximately
$2,520 and $5,300 dollars more than principals with master’s degrees respectively. Those
principals with only a bachelor’s degree tend to earn approximately $4,775 less than
principals with masters’ degrees.
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Table 5.6: Relationship between Principal Characteristics and Salary
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124)
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093)
Model 1
(No
Model 3
Performance
(Percent
Model 2
Variable
Data)
(AYP Data)
Proficient)
160.20**
159.93**
158.31**
Experience (years)
(21.15)
(21.25)
(21.15)
Female

-633.54
(401.22)

-638.89
(401.20)

-710.78
(405.30)

Principal Minority (non white)

-905.10
(613.67)

-877.95
(613.98)

-689.18
(626.16)

-4813.11*
(1506.88)

-4748.57*
(1507.58)

-4742.76*
(1507.25)

-----

-----

-----

Specialist

2619.09**
(467.86)

2613.92**
(467.83)

2656.32**
(470.68)

Doctorate

5321.44**
(935.91)

5389.72**
(937.38)

5258.16**
(950.45)

68,631.30**
(1,337.33)
2570
0.541

67,913.54**
(1,54.06)
2570
0.542

65,468.37**
(1,715.44)
2538
0.540

BA
MA (Omitted)

Intercept
N observations
R2

Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and race
variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year indicator
variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, Male, Year
2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at
p<0.01

Neither a principal’s race nor a principal’s sex appears to impact the level of his
or her salary. It is important to note that these models do not contain all variables that
impact the variation in principal salaries. Table 5.7 below is a comparative analysis of the
extent to which a principal’s demographic characteristics, education, and degree level
impact his or her salary. With a few exceptions, the findings of the subgroup analyses of
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the impact of these variables on a principal’s salary are consistent with the findings for
the complete sample.
Table 5.7: Relationship between Principal Characteristics and Salary by Subgroup
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124)
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093)

Elementary
School
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

Middle
School
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

High
School
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

Combined
Sample
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

Experience (years)

139.20**
(28.74)

57.45**
(0.19)

267.05**
(44.36)

158.31**
(21.25)

Female

1.43
(525.07)

-1391.62
(751.63)

-1188.02
(1039.89)

-710.78
(405.30)

Principal Minority (non
white)

-1669.04*
(742.91)

1009.78
(1444.80)

1704.91
(1680.49)

-689.18
(626.16)

BA
MA (Omitted)

-5971.00**
(2249.50)
-----

-3619.42**
(2954.22)
-----

-4473.58
(2834.48)
-----

-4742.76*
(1507.25)
-----

Specialist

2557.18**
(638.27)

3995.10**
(864.41)

1560.28
(1094.73)

2656.32**
(470.68)

Doctorate

6895.68**
(1338.32)

4664.68**
(1478.88)

3520.93
(2528.21)

5258.16**
(950.45)

65, 984.14**
(2,291.14)
1341
0.523

65, 731.23**
(3,724.04)
508
0.620

Variable

Intercept
N observations
R2

69,819.54** 65,468.37**
(3,266)
(1,715.44)
697
2538
0.526
0.54

Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and race
variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year indicator
variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, Male, Year
2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at
p<0.01
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The Extent to Which Characteristics of Populations Served Impact the Level of Principal
Pay
In this section, I present data on principal pay patterns across districts and schools
with different levels of enrollment, percent of minority students, and percent of poverty
students. I also include a description of pay patterns according to district wealth.
Following this descriptive presentation, I present analysis of the extent to which these
characteristics of districts and schools impact the level of a principal’s salary, when
controlling for other related factors.
District and School Enrollment
The data in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show that principals of districts and schools with
larger enrollments have higher salaries than those in smaller districts and schools. What is
unclear from these data is whether the larger salaries result specifically from having
greater enrollments, or if there are other related factors – such as the school level or a
principal’s degree level – that may be at least in part responsible for these pay patterns.
Table 5.8: Average Salary by District Enrollment Quintile from 2005-06 to 2007-08
District
District
District
Enrollment
Enrollment Salary 05Salary 06Salary 07Enrollment
Quintile
Quintile Max
06
Quintile
Min 2007-08
2007-08
(N=869)
07 (N=860) 08 (N=841)
1
317
780
$ 73,747
$ 77,266
$ 78,882
2
781
1,387
$ 77,005
$ 79,329
$ 83,037
3
1,421
2,895
$ 81,378
$ 84,549
$ 87,000
4
2,946
8,406
$ 86,843
$ 91,373
$ 95,466
5
9,002
25,738
$ 95,213
$ 98,381
$ 100,837
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Table 5.9: Average Salary by School Enrollment Quintile from 2005-06 to 2007-08
School
School
Enrollment Enrollment
School
Quintile
Quintile
Salary 05- Salary 06- Salary 07Enrollment
06
07
08
Min 2007- Max 2007Quintile
08
08
(N=869)
(N=860)
(N=841)
1
0
247
$73,780
$77,234
$79,916
2
249
345
$79,541
$82,845
$84,055
3
346
448
$82,057
$84,485
$88,370
4
449
607
$85,861
$88,907
$93,073
5
609
3135
$93,134
$97,342
$99,980

The analysis in Table 5.10 below suggests that district and school enrollments do
have a significant impact on principal salaries, when holding constant other factors
related to the variation in principal pay. Specifically, principals can expect to earn
approximately one dollar more in salary for each student enrolled in the district and
approximately fourteen dollars more in salary for each student enrolled in his or her
school.
Table 5.10: Excerpt from Regression Table for Question One – The
Extent to Which District and School Enrollment Impact Differences
in the Level of Principal Pay
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124)
For Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093)
Model 1
Model
(No
2
Performance
(AYP
Model 3 (Percent
Variable
Data)
Data)
Proficient)
.80**
.80**
.80**
District Enrollment
(.04)
(.04)
(.04)
School Enrollment
Intercept
N observations
R2

14.11**
(0.75)

14.25**
(.76)

14.01**
(.76)

68,631.30**
(1,337.33)
2570
0.541

67,913.54**
(1,54.06)
2570
0.542

65,468.37**
(1,715.44)
2538
0.540
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Independent variables included: School and district level poverty,
size, wealth, and race variables; principal degree level, experience,
race, and sex variables; year indicator variables and performance
variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, Male, Year 200506, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05;
**Significant at p<0.01

The coefficients, presented in the subgroup analysis of Table 5.11 below, regarding the
impact of district and school enrollments, are consistent with those of the combined
sample.
Table 5.11: Excerpt from Regression Table for Question One – The Extent to Which
District and School Enrollment Impact Differences in the Level of Principal Pay by
Subgroup
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124)
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093)
Elementary
Middle
High
Combined
School
School
School
Sample
Model 3
Model 3
Model 3
Model 3
(Percent
(Percent
(Percent
(Percent
Variable
Proficient)
Proficient)
Proficient)
Proficient)
District Enrollment

.74**
(.06)

.82**
(.10)

.76**
(.13)

.80**
(.04)

School Enrollment

13.01**
(.76)

17.18**
(2.11)

14.61**
(1.40)

14.01**
(.76)

65, 984.14**
(2,291.14)
1341
0.523

65, 731.23**
(3,724.04)
508
0.620

69,819.54**
(3,266)
697
0.526

65,468.37**
(1,715.44)
2538
0.54

Intercept
N observations
R2

Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and race
variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year indicator
variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, Male, Year
2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at
p<0.01
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District and School Percent Minority

The data in Tables 5.12 and 5.13 show that principals of districts and schools with
larger percentages of minority students enrolled generally have higher salaries than those
in districts and schools smaller percentages of minority students enrolled. Again, it is
unclear from these data whether these larger salaries result specifically from having
greater minority enrollments, or if there are other related factors – such as the school
level or a principal’s degree level – that may be at least in part responsible.

Table 5.12: Average Salary by District Percent Minority Quintile from 2005-06 to 200708
District
District
District
Percent
Percent
Percent
Minority
Minority
Salary 05Salary
Salary
Minority Quintile Min Quintile Max
06
06-07
07-08
Quintile
2007-08
2007-08
(N=869)
(N=860)
(N=841)
1
1
4
$ 77,072
$ 80,324
$ 83,485
2
4
13
$ 80,223
$ 82,890
$ 85,638
3
13
33
$ 83,172
$ 86,731
$ 90,490
4
33
50
$ 88,584
$ 91,279
$ 93,218
5
50
97
$ 85,266
$ 89,511
$ 92,523

Table 5.13: Average Salary by School Percent Minority Quintile from 2005-06 to 200708
School
School
School
Percent
Percent
Percent
Minority
Minority
Salary
Salary
Salary
Minority
Quintile Min Quintile Max
05-06
06-07
07-08
Quintile
2007-08
2007-08
(N=869)
(N=860) (N=841)
1
0%
4%
$77,159
$80,637
$83,359
2
4%
11%
$80,349
$83,150
$85,539
3
11%
31%
$84,579
$86,584
$91,036
4
31%
55%
$85,725
$90,316
$92,557
5
55%
100%
$86,561
$86,157
$92,792
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The analysis in Table 5.14 below is consistent with the patterns above and
suggests that district minority enrollment percentages do have a significant, positive
impact on principal salaries, when holding constant other factors related to the variation
in principal pay. Specifically, for each percentage point increase in minority enrollment at
the district level, principals earn an additional 60 dollars per year. School minority
percent is, however, not a significant predictor.
Table 5.14: Excerpt from Regression Table for Question One – The Extent to Which
District and School Minority Enrollment Percentages Impact Differences in the Level of
Principal Pay
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124)
For Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093)

Variable
District_Minority%
School_Minority%
Intercept
N observations
R2

Model 1
(No Performance
Data)
58.38*
(26.95)

Model 2
(AYP Data)
58.79*
(26.95)

Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)
65.60*
(27.27)

-7.06
(24.84)

-4.27
(24.94)

-2.03
(25.37)

68,631.30**
(1,337.33)
2570
0.541

67,913.54**
(1,54.06)
2570
0.542

65,468.37**
(1,715.44)
2538
0.540

Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and
race variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year
indicator variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s
degree, Male, Year 2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at
p<0.05; **Significant at p<0.01

The coefficients, presented in the subgroup analysis of Table 5.15 below,
regarding the impact of district and school enrollments on principal pay, are not
consistent with those of the combined sample. Specifically, district percent minority is no
longer a significant predictor of variation in principal salary, when the combined sample
is disaggregated by school level.
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Table 5.15: Excerpt from Regression Table for Question One – The Extent to Which
District and School Minority Enrollment Percentages Impact Differences in the Level of
Principal Pay by Subgroup
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124)
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093)
Elementary
Middle
High
Combined
School
School
School
Sample
Model 3
Model 3
Model 3
Model 3
(Percent
(Percent
(Percent
(Percent
Variable
Proficient)
Proficient)
Proficient)
Proficient)
District_Minority%

46.22
(30.45)

88.62
(81.82)

-39.67
(96.36)

65.60*
(27.27)

School_Minority%

7.87
(27.53)

7.12
(80.60)

86.91
(92.74)

-2.03
(25.37)

65, 984.14**
(2,291.14)
1341
0.523

65, 731.23**
(3,724.04)
508
0.620

69,819.54**
(3,266)
697
0.526

65,468.37**
(1,715.44)
2538
0.54

Intercept
N observations
R2

Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and race
variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year indicator
variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, Male, Year
2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at
p<0.01
District and School Poverty
The data in Table 5.16 show that principals in wealthier districts – i.e. those that
have larger income per pupil related to that district’s local tax base – are generally better
paid than principals in lower wealth districts. Further, the data in Tables 5.17 and 5.18
show that principals of districts and schools with larger percentages of poverty students
enrolled generally have lower salaries than those in districts and schools smaller
percentages of poverty students enrolled. Again, it is unclear from these data whether the
smaller salaries result specifically from having higher percentages of poverty students, or
if there are other related factors that may be at least in part responsible for these patterns.
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Table 5.16: Average Salary by District Wealth Index Quintile from 2005-06 to 2007-08
District
Wealth District Wealth District Wealth Salary
Salary
Salary
Index
Index Quintile Index Quintile
05-06
06-07
07-08
Quintile
Min 2007-08
Max 2007-08 (N=869) (N=860) (N=841)
1
0.14
0.37
$78,946 $82,702 $85,621
2
0.37
0.46
$77,899 $81,613 $83,992
3
0.47
0.61
$79,437 $83,052 $85,848
4
0.61
0.83
$84,325 $86,684 $91,833
5
0.86
1
$93,748 $96,669 $98,043

Table 5.17: Average Salary by District Percent FRL Quintile from 2005-06 to 2007-08
District
District
District
Percent Percent FRL Percent FRL Salary
Salary
Salary
FRL
Quintile Min Quintile Max 05-06
06-07
07-08
Quintile
2007-08
2007-08
(N=869) (N=860) (N=841)
1
16
45
$85,719 $88,677 $93,520
2
46
53
$87,819 $88,104 $88,729
3
53
60
$78,917 $83,451 $90,719
4
60
70
$84,502 $88,428 $87,659
5
70
100
$77,360 $81,927 $84,782

Table 5.18: Average Salary by School Percent FRL Quintile from 2005-06 to 2007-08
School
School
School
Percent Percent FRL Percent FRL
Salary
Salary
Salary
FRL
Quintile Min Quintile Max
05-06
06-07
07-08
Quintile
2007-08
2007-08
(N=869) (N=860) (N=841)
1
0%
41%
$87,936 $91,503 $96,322
2
41%
51%
$85,353 $86,136 $89,199
3
52%
62%
$80,984 $85,098 $86,388
4
62%
73%
$78,821 $82,802 $85,667
5
74%
100%
$81,341 $85,262 $87,735

The analysis in Table 5.19 below suggests that district wealth has a positive,
significant impact on principal pay and that district percentages of poverty students have
a significant, negative impact on principal salaries. Specifically, for each percentage point
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increase in district percent poverty enrollment, principals earn over 85 dollars less per
year. However, school percentages of poverty students do not tend to have a significant
impact on principal salaries, when holding constant other factors related to the variation
in principal pay.
Table 5.19: Excerpt from Regression Table for Question One – The Extent to
Which District and School Percent Poverty and District Wealth Impact Differences
in the Level of Principal Pay
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124)
For Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093)
Model 1
(No Performance
Data)

Model 2
(AYP Data)

Model 3 (Percent
Proficient)

District _FRL%

-83.31*
(28.03)

-82.97*
(28.03)

-92.16**
(28.34)

School_FRL%

-3.97
(23.42)

-2.82
(23.43)

13.44
(24.05)

District_Wealth

26.78*
(10.56)

26.34*
(10.57)

24.53*
(10.63)

68,631.30**
(1,337.33)
2570
0.541

67,913.54**
(1,54.06)
2570
0.542

65,468.37**
(1,715.44)
2538
0.540

Variable

Intercept
N observations
R2

Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and
race variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year
indicator variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s
degree, Male, Year 2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at
p<0.05; **Significant at p<0.01

The coefficients, presented in the subgroup analysis of Table 5.20 below
– regarding the impact of district and school percentages of poverty students and
the influence of a district’s wealth on principal pay – are only partially consistent
with those of the combined sample. In particular, the district wealth index variable
only retains significance in the elementary principal sample and district FRL is not
significant in the high school sample analysis.
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Table 5.20: Excerpt from Regression Table for Question One – The Extent
to Which District and School Percent Poverty and District Wealth Impact
Differences in the Level of Principal Pay by Subgroup
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124)
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093)
Elementary
School
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

Middle
School
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

High
School
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

Combined
Sample
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

District _FRL%

-77.95*
(28.03)

-152.38**
(32.61)

-32.35
(82.46)

-92.16**
(28.34)

School_FRL%

-25.60
(26.20)

92.02
(76.65)

-54.61
(69.35)

13.44
(24.05)

District_Wealth

58.35**
(14.68)

.63
(21.27)

-25.27
(21.78)

24.53*
(10.63)

Intercept
N observations
R2

65, 984**
(2,291.14)
1341
0.523

65, 731.23**
(3,724.04)
508
0.620

69,819.54**
(3,266)
697
0.526

65,468.37**
(1,715.44)
2538
0.54

Variable

Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and
race variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year
indicator variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s
degree, Male, Year 2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at
p<0.05; **Significant at p<0.01

School Level
The data in Table 5.21 show that principals of high schools earn more than
principals of elementary schools, but that principals of middle schools earn more than
principals of high schools. It is unclear from these data whether there is in fact a higher
salary return for working in a middle school, or if there are other related factors that may
be at least in part responsible for these patterns.
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Table 5.21: Average Principal Salaries by School Level from 2005-06 to 2007-08
Avg
N
Avg
N
Avg
N
Salary
Salary 2006Salary 2007 2007- Total
School
2005Avg
Level
06
2005-06
07
2006-07 -08
08
N
Overall
Elementary
Middle
High
Total

453
163
253
869

$81,288
$86,416
$83,456
$82,881

455
175
230
860

$84,568
$89,553
$86,717
$86,157

434
174
234
841

$87,350
$92,252
$89,847
$89,059

1342
512
717
2570

$84,361
$89,472
$86,588
$85,999

The data in Table 5.22 below indicate that principals of middle schools and high
schools both earn higher salaries relative to their elementary school colleagues, holding
all things constant. However, contrary to the patterns revealed in table 5.20 above, middle
school principals are not paid more than high school principals due to school level, when
holding constant other factors that might influence principal pay.
Table 5.22: Excerpt from Regression Table for Question One – The Extent to
Which School Level Impacts Differences in the Level of Principal Pay
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124)
For Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093)
Model 1
(No Performance
Data)

Model 2
(AYP Data)

Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

-----

-----

-----

Middle School

3575.33**
(496.51)

3668.60**
(501.97)

4016.51**
(514.21)

High School

4253.74**
(534.57)

4308.74**
(536.31)

4950.29**
(583.76)

68,631.30**
(1,337.33)

67,913.54**
(1,54.06)

65,468.37**
(1,715.44)

2570
0.541

2570
0.542

2538
0.540

Variable
Elementary School (Omitted)

Intercept
N observations
R2

Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and
race variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year
indicator variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s
degree, Male, Year 2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at
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p<0.05; **Significant at p<0.01

The Extent to Which a Principal’s Prior Performance Impacts the Level of Pay
In this section, I present an excerpt from the question one regression analysis that
focuses on the extent to which a principal’s performance in a previous year impacts the
level of his or her salary in the subsequent year, while holding constant other observable
factors that influence the level of a principal’s pay.
Table 5.23 below is a comparison of principals who were in schools that met AYP
in the prior year as opposed to those who were in schools that failed AYP in the prior
year. At the elementary school level, there is virtually no difference between the salaries
of those who met and those who failed AYP. At the middle and high school levels,
principals who met AYP in the prior year were actually lower paid on average than
principals who failed AYP. This pattern could reflect a number of possibilities, including
the potential that smaller schools or districts were more likely to meet AYP or that high
minority districts were less likely to meet AYP. It is also noteworthy that the experience
levels – which do impact pay – are also virtually the same between the two groups of
principals at the middle and high school levels.
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Table 5.23: Characteristics of Principals who Failed AYP in Time t-1
vs. Principals who Met AYP in Time t-1 from 2004-05 to 2007-08
School Level
Elem
Middle
High
Total
N Principals (Met AYP)
1409
389
696
2494
N Principals (Failed AYP)
280
207
210
697
Average Salary (Met AYP)
$76,379 $78,916 $76,337 $76,765
Average Salary (Failed AYP)
$76,130 $85,421 $84,091 $81,289
Average Experience (Met AYP)
22.7
21.9
21.3
22.2
Average Experience (Failed AYP)
Percent Female (Met AYP)
Percent Female (Failed AYP)

23.4
68%
70%

21.1
34%
44%

22.5
16%
22%

22.4
48%
48%

Table 5.24 below presents the extent to which the level of performance of a
principal in a prior year impacts the level of his or her salary. In Model 1, no performance
data are included. When including AYP data in Model 2 – i.e. whether a principal served
in a school that met AYP in the prior year – the predictive power of the model is not
appreciably larger. Moreover, according to the data in Table 5.24, whether or not a
principal met AYP in the prior year does not have a significant impact on the level of his
or her salary. Therefore, it can be said that the differences in the salaries observed at the
middle and high school levels in Table 5.23 above not influenced by a principal’s
performance, as measured by AYP.
Table 5.24: The Extent to which Prior Performance of a Principal Impacts the Level of
Principal Pay
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124)
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093)
Model 1
(No
Model 3
Performance
(Percent
Model 2
Variable
Data)
(AYP Data)
Proficient)
606.54
Meets_AYP
--------(482.66)
Average % proficient time t-1

-----

-----
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44.78*
(15.42)

Intercept
N observations
R2

68,631.30**
(1,337.33)
2570
0.541

67,913.54**
(1,54.06)
2570
0.542

65,468.37**
(1,715.44)
2538
0.540

Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and race
variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year indicator
variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, Male, Year
2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at
p<0.01

In Model 3, however, which includes a different performance variable – the
average percent proficient of the students on the state academic assessment in the school
where the principal served in the prior year – performance is a statistically significant
predictor of variation in the level of a principal’s salary, holding all other factors
constant. It is worth noting that this performance variable, though statistically
significant, does not appear to have a particularly large impact on the level of salary in
terms of actual dollars. Increasing the percent proficient by one standard deviation – a
relatively large increase (approximately a 17 percentage point increase in percent
proficient is required to move from the 50th percentile to the 84th percentile of the percent
proficient performance distribution, or literally moving from the mean of 55 percent
proficient to 72 percent proficient) – would result in a salary increase of about 0.03
standard deviations – about $760, or not even 1 percent of the average principal salary
during this time period. Additionally, it is noteworthy that including this variable in the
model does not improve its explanatory power.
The subgroup analysis by school level on the impact of a principal’s performance,
as measured by percent proficient on principal salary levels, is generally consistent with
the findings above. It is noteworthy that the coefficient on performance is much larger at
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the middle school level than at the elementary level and not at significant at the high
school level. These positive coefficients are still not particularly large, however.

Table 5.25: The Extent to which Prior Performance of a Principal Impacts the Level
of Principal Pay by Subgroup
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124)
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093)

Variable
Average % proficient time
t-1
Intercept
N observations
R2

Elementary
School
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

Middle
School Model
3 (Percent
Proficient)

High
School
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

Combined
Sample
Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

45.37*
(19.49)

109.71**
(40.23)

8.48
(34.34)

44.78*
(15.42)

65, 984.14**
(2,291.14)
1341
0.523

65, 731.23**
(3,724.04)
508
0.620

69,819.54** 65,468.37**
(3,266)
(1,715.44)
697
2538
0.526
0.54

Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and race
variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year indicator
variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, Male, Year
2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at
p<0.01
Characteristics and Effectiveness of Principals Who Leave the Profession
The data in Table 5.26 below show that, across school levels, principals who
leave the profession tend to have roughly the same characteristics as those who stay in
the profession. Further, there is virtually no difference between the performance of those
who leave and those who remain in the profession.
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Table 5.26: Comparisons between Principals who Stay in the Data Set and Those
who Leave from 2005-06 to 2006-07
Elem
Middle
High
Total
School Level
N Leavers
186
78
162
426
N Stayers
1503
518
744
2765
Average Salary Leavers T-1
$74,384 $79,415 $79,162 $77,083
Average Salary Stayers T-1
$76,580 $81,435 $77,938 $77,859
Average Experience Leavers T-1
24.2
23.2
24.1
24
Average Experience Stayers T-1
22.6
21.4
21
22
Percent of Leavers Who Are Female
68%
27%
21%
42%
Percent of Stayers Who are Female
68%
39%
17%
49%
Percent of Leavers Who Meet AYP
84%
68%
79%
79%
Percent of Stayers Who Meet AYP
83%
65%
76%
78%
Average Percent Proficient of Leavers
57%
49%
48%
52%
Average Percent Proficient of Stayers
59%
53%
49%
55%

The data in Table 5.27 below show that there is a difference in the turnover rates
of principals – defined as one minus the ratio of principals who remain in the same
position in the same school year over year – based on performance. In this analysis
principals were grouped as high- (principals in the top third in percent proficient),
medium- (principals in the middle third in percent proficient), and low-performing
(principals in the bottom third in percent proficient).
Table 5.27: Turnover Rate for Group of Principals by Performance Category

Year
2004-05 to 2005-06
2005-06 to 2006-07
2006-07 to 2007-08

Principal Performance Category
Low
Medium
High
Performing
Performing
Performing
27.2%
21.6%
21.3%
32.5%
18.0%
19.9%
23.4%
17.1%
16.3%
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These data indicate that there is greater turnover among principals at low-performing
schools than at medium- or high-performing schools. There is not an appreciable
difference between turnover at medium- and high-performing schools.
Summary of Question One Findings
In sum for question one, I find that the following are significant predictors of the
variation in a principal’s salary:
•

a principal’s experience (positive) and degree level (positive), but not his or her
sex or race;

•

the school level at which a principal serves, where high school principals are paid
more than middle school principals, who are in turn paid more than elementary
principals;

•

district factors, including district size (positive), district wealth (positive), district
percent of poverty students enrolled (negative), and district percent of minority
students (negative) enrolled, for combined sample only;

•

school size (positive), but not a school’s percent of poverty students enrolled, nor
a school’s percent of minority students enrolled;

•

the year (positive) in which a principal is employed;

•

performance (positive) when reported as percent proficient, but not when given as
meeting AYP.

Subgroup analyses of the impacts of the included variables on principal salary by school
level largely confirm the findings for the combined sample. The most noteworthy
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difference was the district percent minority is not significant in any of the subgroup
samples, in contrast to the finding for district percent minority for the combined sample.
Of these variables, the largest determinants are: school level, degree level, and year.
District and school variables that were significant have a very small impact on salary
variation.
Findings of Research Question Two: Factors Influencing Changes in Principal Pay
Research question two focuses on the extent to which a principal’s performance
impacts the magnitude of the change in his or her principal’s salary. That is, I am
investigating whether a principal’s performance in time t-1 impacts the magnitude of the
principal’s salary increase between time t and time t-1. The findings of this question
combined with those of question one above give insight into the presence of performance
incentives that may already exist in the principal labor market.
The district and school factors – e.g. size and poverty status – that impact the
level of a principal’s pay are intentionally excluded from this analysis. Not controlling for
these sources of variation in the level of principal pay allows the model to measure the
effects of, for example having highly successful principals to move from less lucrative
positions to better paying principalships in larger schools or districts. Experience is
excluded from the models in question two because all principals in the analysis will be
seen to gain a one-year change in experience; this average gain will be captured in the
year dummy variable. Further, a principal’s own time invariant characteristics (race and
sex) are excluded. The change in level of degree, however, is included, as a principal can
increase his or her degree level from year to year.
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Table 5.28: Regression Coefficients for Question Two – The Relationship between School
Performance and the Change in Principal Pay from 2005-06 to 2007-08
Model 1 Dependent Variable: Salary in Time t (M=86,057; SD=13,114)
Model 2 Dependent Variable: Salary in Time t (M=$86,058; SD=13,083)
Model 1
Model 2
(AYP)
(Percent Proficient)
Variable
Meets_AYP
Percent Proficient Plus

-289.61
(312.23)
-----

.79**
(.01)
681.17
Earned Specialist Degree
(1220.58)
6,455.45**
Earned Doctorate Degree
(2924.08)
-6,753.51**
Year 2006-07
(337.00)
-6,912.86**
Year 2007-08
(351.62)
28,844.49**
Intercept
(745.61)
N Observations
2550
R2
0.753
*Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at p<0.01
Salary t-1
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-----130.23
(799.64)
.79**
(.01)
623.40
(1244.69)
6,423.56**
(2931.53)
-6,715.51**
(344.33)
-6,869.99**
(365.68)
28,771.98**
(798.41)
2518
0.751

The findings in Table 5.28 suggest that a principal’s performance – as measured
by meeting AYP or by the percent of students scoring proficient or better on state
achievement tests – is not a significant predictor of change in his or her salary year to
year. Those principals who earn doctorate degrees do, however, receive a rather large
increase on average. It is also interesting to note that the change in salary from 2005-06
to 2006-07 was on average much larger than the change in salary over the successive two
years. This large average change in salary in the first year of the analysis may have been
due to infusions of money into the education system that resulted from the Lake View
decision.
Chapter Five Summary
The findings of the analysis presented above can best be summarized by
addressing the study’s research hypotheses.
Research Hypothesis 1a: The findings above confirm that principals of high
schools and middle schools can expect to earn higher salaries than those in elementary
schools and that principals of high schools earn more than those in middle schools, when
holding constant the other factors that influence the variation in principal pay. The fact
that pay patterns by school level show that Arkansas middle school principals earn more
than high school principals is not related to school level, but to other characteristics of
those principals.
Research Hypothesis 1b: The findings above confirm that school enrollment is a
significant, positive determinant of principal pay both at the district and school level,
holding all else constant.
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Research Hypothesis 1c: The findings above confirm that principals in lower
income districts and in schools that serve poorer students earn less than principals in
wealthier districts and schools that serve fewer poor students, holding all else constant.
Research Hypothesis 1d: The findings above do not confirm that principals in
districts with higher minority student populations are significantly better paid than those
in districts with lower percentages of minority students, all else equal. Although the
combined analysis confirmed the positive impact of increased minority enrollment at the
district level on salary, the subgroup analysis failed to reinforce this finding.
Research Hypothesis 1e: The findings above confirm that principals with
advanced degrees (specialist, doctorate, etc.) and more experience (years on the job) earn
more than those with lower level degrees and less experience, holding all else constant.
As anticipated, the higher the level of a principal’s educational attainment, the higher the
salary he or she earns, all else equal.
Research Hypothesis 1f: The findings above show that neither principal race nor
principal sex is a significant predictor of principal pay.
Research Hypothesis 1g: The findings above largely fail to support the hypothesis
that principal pay increases as principals are more successful, as measured by their
performance in the prior year, when holding all else constant. When principal
performance in the prior year is measured by whether his or her school met AYP in the
prior year, principal pay is not affected. There is a significant effect on pay of the percent
proficient in the prior year, however, when performance is measured by the percent
proficient or better on the state assessments of the principal’s school in the prior year.
The subgroup analyses indicate that more successful principals, as measured by the
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percent proficient variable, earn higher salaries as a result in elementary and middle
schools, but not in high schools. It is important to note that these statistically significant
finding are practically unimportant. For the combined sample, increasing the percent
proficient by one standard deviation results in an increase of 0.06 standard deviations in
salary. Additionally, it is noteworthy that including either performance variable in the
model does not improve its explanatory power.
Research Hypothesis 2: The findings above fail to support the hypothesis that
principals who perform better in the prior year (meet AYP or have higher percent
proficient) earn greater salary increases year-over-year.
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Chapter 6: Discussion
Pay Incentives in the Existing Principal Labor Market
This study was designed to investigate the nature of pay incentives in the existing
principal labor market. Specifically, I was investigating if principals who perform better
earn higher salaries and if better principals are differentially rewarded with larger pay
raises – either by earning performance pay awards or by moving to higher paying jobs. In
exploring these questions, I also investigated the extent to which a principal’s own
characteristics, such as a principal’s race, degree level, and experience, might impact both
the level of pay and the magnitude of change in pay. At the same time, I attempted to
gauge the extent to which the characteristics of the populations served, with respect to a
district or school’s racial makeup, poverty status, size, or level, might impact both the
level of a principal’s pay and also the size of changes in a principal’s pay.
Alongside these analyses, I examined patterns of principal pay with respect to
enrollments, racial composition, or poverty levels, without holding constant related
factors. The purpose of presenting these descriptive findings in comparison to the
findings of the regression analyses was to determine whether any apparent patterns of
principal pay may be reflecting principals’ own characteristics or performance, rather
than the characteristics of the populations served. For example, I investigated whether
principals serving districts with higher poverty rates tended to be paid less because, in
fact, those districts might not be able to pay higher salaries, or because, for example,
poorer districts might not be able to attract mostly experienced principals. The findings in
the regression analyses provided insight into this type of question by showing, on
average, whether any variation in principal pay was due to the poverty level of the
108

district, and if so, the extent of that negative impact. The comparison of the descriptive
patterns of principal pay across districts with varying levels of percent poverty to the
findings in the regression analysis, in which district percent poverty was an included
variable, did not in itself fully resolve the question of whether poorer districts pay less or
have inexperienced principals. However, the findings of the regression analysis do
suggest, in the current case at least, that principals, regardless of their experience, tend to
earn less in higher poverty districts.
Impact of Principal’s Performance on Pay
A principal’s performance has little to no impact on his or her pay. Those
principals who met AYP in the prior year neither earned a higher salary nor earned a
larger raise in salary than principals who led schools that failed AYP. This finding
suggests either that performance has no impact on pay, or that meeting or failing AYP is
simply an irrelevant measure of principal performance to those who monitor a principal’s
work.
When including a continuous (and better) measure of principal performance – the
percent of students in a principal’s school in the prior year who performed proficient or
better on the state’s standardized achievement test – I did find a positive, significant
impact on principal pay. However, even when the performance variable was statistically
significant, its impact on the variation in principal pay was extremely small. A very large
one standard deviation increase in percent proficient resulted in a less than 1 percent
increase in principal pay.

Interestingly, the subgroup analyses indicated that more

successful principals, as measured by the percent proficient variable, earn higher salaries
in elementary and middle schools, but not in high schools. One of the reasons for
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conducting the subgroup analysis by school level was to unpack how the differences in
school performance by school level might be related to differences in pay. It is the case
that elementary schools tend to have higher levels of percent proficient, as there is a
greater variance in student performance as students progress through school. Nonetheless,
there is not a obvious explanation for why performance might be differentially rewarded
at one school level rather than the other.
Impact of a Principal’s Characteristics on Pay
The findings in this study suggest that principals wishing to increase their pay
would do better to expend extra effort earning an advanced degree after school hours,
than to expend any additional effort on raising student performance during the day. On
average, principals with specialist’s degrees earn three percent more than those with
master’s degrees, and principals with doctorate degrees earn over six percent more than
those with master’s degrees, all else equal. Moreover, in the year after that the doctorate
degree is earned, principals can expect to see a large, statistically significant pay increase
of approximately seven percent. Fortunately, from the perspective of pay equity, a
principal’s race and sex are unrelated to his or her level of pay.
Impact of the Characteristics of Population Served on Principal Pay
All else equal, principals wishing to increase their salaries should seek to work in
middle or high schools instead of in elementary schools. The difference between the
average middle and high school salary is not particularly large as a percent of total
average salary. But on average, principals of middle schools earn over four percent more
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than elementary principals, and principals of high schools earn over five percent more
than elementary principals, all else equal.
The findings in this study related to school and district enrollment demographic
characteristics and enrollment size suggest that variation in principal pay among districts
is greater than principal pay variation within districts. Of the included school
characteristics, only school enrollment was a significant predictor of the variation in
principal pay. For the combined sample, all district level variables were significant
predictors of principal pay, but the subgroup analysis failed to reinforce the finding that
high minority districts pay better salaries.
Despite my original inability to identify a policy that might account for the
hypothesis that principals in high minority districts would earn better pay, I did in fact
predict that increases district minority would be associated with higher principal pay
because of the findings in Barnett, Ritter, and Riffel (2008) regarding pay patterns for
Arkansas teachers. In a purely descriptive analysis, Barnett, Ritter, and Riffel (2008) had
found that teachers in high minority districts were better paid than those in low minority
districts. So, I assumed that these patterns would be duplicated at the principal level.
Before running the subgroup analyses, I did nonetheless seek to determine if there could
be a policy-relevant explanation for my findings regarding the combined sample.
Because there was not a policy relevant explanation for the combined sample
finding that high minority districts would pay principals better than low minority
districts, all else equal, I re-ran the regression analyses and included a dummy variable
for the three districts that have received significant state desegregation aid since the late
1980’s. Little Rock School District, North Little Rock School District, and Pulaski
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County Special School District together receive approximately $70 million annually from
the state (Howell, 2008). Including this dummy variable for districts that receive
desegregation money did not, however, provide more clarity or appreciably change the
coefficient on minority or its significance. The explanation for this combined sample
finding may be contained in the error term. Fortunately, given the fact that the only
apparent policy explanation for the significant positive combined sample finding on
district percent minority turned out to be untenable, the subgroup analyses did provide
some clarity that a district’s minority percentage are rather unlikely, after all, to be a
significant predictor of variation in principal pay.
Findings in Context of Existing Related Literature
As noted in the introductory chapters, little research has been performed on
principal compensation systems and the viability of performance pay programs for these
school leaders (Goldhaber, 2007). Two studies (Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007) and
Goldhaber (2007) directly explore the factors that are responsible for the variation in
principal salaries. In his study of national data, which were pulled three times over a tenyear period from 1993-94 to 2003-04, Goldhaber (2007) attempted to uncover the
specific district and school level factors that impact principal pay. He did not use a direct
performance variable, but inferred that the lower amount of variance explained by
observed variables included in his models, relative to the amount that can be explained in
similar models of teacher pay, may include some aspect of performance pay. Cullen and
Mazzeo (2007) explored principal labor market data in Texas from 1989-2006. Although
they did include information about the relative impact of control variables, Cullen and
Mazzeo (2007) provided direct – as opposed to inferred – evidence that more effective
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principals are rewarded with higher salaries. Table 6.1 below summarizes key features of
the current study with relation to these prior studies.
Table 6.1: Comparison of Current Study Findings to those in Existing Principal
Compensation Literature
Current
Study
Goldhaber
Cullen and Mazzeo
(2009)
(2007)
(2007)
National Data
Study Location
Arkansas
Texas
Set
3 data pulls
Time Frame of Total
over 10 year
16 years
3 years
Study Sample
period
1993-94, 1999Dates for Analysis Sample
2005-2008
1989-2005
00, 2003-04
N
2,570
9,098
14,723
Range of Explained
0.540-0.750
0.44-0.46
Not Reported
Variance All Models
Principal Race
NS
S/NS
Unclear
Principal Sex
NS
S/NS
Unclear
Principal Experience
S
S
Unclear
Advanced Degree
S
S
Unclear
Prior Teaching/Admin
Experience

Not
Included

S

Unclear

S

S/NS

School Race

NS

S/NS

School Percent Poverty

NS

S/NS

School Percent LEP

Not
Included

Not Included

District Enrollment

S

S/NS

District Race

S

Not Included

District Percent Poverty

S

Not Included

District Wealth Variable

S

Not Included

Unclear
Included/Not
Reported
Included/Not
Reported
Included/Not
Reported
Included/Not
Reported
Included/Not
Reported
Included/Not
Reported
Included/Not
Reported
Included/Not
Reported

School Enrollment

Urbanicity
Region of Country

Not
Included
Not
Relevant

S
S
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Not Relevant

School Level
Pupil-Teacher Ratio
Performance Variable

S
Not
Included
S/NS

S

Included/Not
Reported

S/NS

Not Included

Not Included

S

The information in Table 6.1 above indicates that the current study’s findings are
largely consistent with those of Goldhaber (2007). In particular, in both studies,
principals of secondary schools earn higher salaries than those in elementary schools, and
principals in larger and wealthier districts earn higher salaries. In addition, principals with
more experience and with advanced degrees are better paid in both studies. Moreover,
school and district size are significant, positive predictors of principal pay in both studies.
The most useful comparison to Cullen and Mazzeo (2007) involves the principal
performance variable. In analyzing the career paths of full-time principals, they found
that principals of the highest performing schools experienced greater increases in wages
than did principals of low performing schools when moving to new positions. Moreover,
when examining the wage changes for principals who remained at their current jobs, they
found that principals of the highest performing schools similarly experienced greater
wage growth than did principals of low performing schools.
In the current study, I only found performance to be a significant, positive
predictor of principal pay in the models that included the percent proficient variable of
for principal performance. And, the impact of this variable on salary was very small.
Further, my findings regarding implicit rewards – i.e. the notion that high performing
principals find a way to sort themselves into higher pay principalships – do not indicate
that such a system is operating in the Arkansas principal labor market. By contrast,
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Cullen and Mazzeo (2007) argue that their findings provide evidence of implicit rewards
in the Texas principal labor market related to higher performance. In addition to the
likely presence of implicit financial rewards in the Texas principal labor market, key
policy differences between Arkansas and Texas that have impacted principal pay may
also contribute to the difference in findings between these studies. As described in
Chapter One, performance pay programs for educators in Texas have surfaced across
districts in Texas over the last two decades (Lewis and Springer, 2008).
One other existing study of the relationship between principal performance and
rewards in the labor market in Texas (Ladd, 1999) has relevance for contextualizing the
current study’s findings. In her study of how accountability and performance award
systems impact various aspects of schooling, Ladd (1999) analyzed the impacts of the
Dallas Independent School District’s school-based accountability and performance
incentive program. In this program which started in 1991, schools were measured on their
ability to raise student performance on standardized tests. Those schools that were most
effective – approximately the top 20 percent in the district – received financial bonuses,
which were distributed to everyone on the school staff, including principals (Ladd, 1999).
In addition to seeing positive impacts on student performance that were at least in part
attributable to the program, Ladd (1999) found a dramatic increase in principal turnover
over the course of the performance incentive program’s implementation. Ladd showed
that prior to the program, principal turnover rates in least effective schools, average
effective schools, and most effective schools were 2.4 percent, 6.7 percent, and 6.3
percent, respectively. By the end of the program these rates had increased to 24.6 percent,
25.0 percent, and 24.4 percent, respectively. Ladd (1999) asserted, “Thus, it appears that
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the new emphasis on accountability made the District much more willing than in the past
to change principals” (p. 14). She concluded that this compositional effect on the
principal workforce may have been due to the program and that this change, which was
most dramatic in the lowest performing schools, could have positive impacts on student
performance.
In the current study, I also conducted an exploratory analysis of the differences in
principal retention patterns among various performance levels. I found that across school
levels, principals who leave the profession tend to have roughly the same characteristics
as those who stay in the profession. Further, there is virtually no difference between the
performance of those who leave and those who remain in the profession. I did, however,
find that there is a difference in the turnover rates of principals – defined as one minus
the ratio of principals who remain in the same position in the same school year over year
– based on performance. In this analysis of principal turnover by performance level, I
grouped principals as high- (principals in the top third in percent proficient), medium(principals in the middle third in percent proficient), and low-performing (principals in
the bottom third in percent proficient). My findings of differential turnover rates by level
of performance might have several explanations. It could be that, as Ladd (1999)
suggested, low-performing schools have, at times, been more likely to change their
principals. Alternatively, new principals might get their first jobs at low-performing
schools, and after getting a few years of experience, they might be eager to move to lesschallenging principalships elsewhere. Further investigation of these, and other,
hypotheses should be conducted in future studies.
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Study Limitations
The greatest limitation for this study is that the measures of principal performance
are relatively basic. Although there is a reasonable justification for using principal
performance measures that are publicly reported, as I have done, the performance
variables in this study only take into account the performance of a principal in the prior
year. It is true that both performance measures – AYP and percent proficient – do not
take into account the fact that principals may be serving different types of student
populations.
High performing schools, and principals, could be seen to be those that contribute
to disproportionate growth in student performance, after controlling for the prior
performance of the student body and student demographics. By predicting a school’s
performance and then determining whether a school beats that prediction, I could have a
different measure of principal effectiveness. My analysis could then explore whether
principals, who are viewed as effective by looking at absolute performance measures, are
in fact the same ones who are effective in promoting student achievement growth. I
could then compare pay differentials based relative to this new performance measure.
Finally, the lack of availability of data on principals’ prior and subsequent career
choices and salaries also limits the strength of inferences that can be drawn. Additionally,
some cases were lost due to missing salaries or other control variables. In total, attrition
was approximately 20 percent. To the extent that the analysis sample did not accurately
represent the population, my findings will be skewed.
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Chapter 7: Recommendations
Recommendations for Policymakers
This study was designed to be a guide Arkansas state policymakers who might
consider improvements in educational leadership at the school level as strategy to address
the public policy problem of low student achievement. To date, little research has been
conducted on the principal labor market to determine what drives differences in principal
pay and to examine how introducing pay incentives into the principal labor market might
impact current principal behaviors, regarding their prioritizing of job responsibilities or
concerning their decisions about where to work. Before considering modifications to
principal compensation structures, policymakers in Arkansas – both at the state and local
level – need to know what incentives exist already and how principals have tended to
respond to those incentives.
The theoretical framework for the study was principal-agent theory. As noted
above, the complexity of having multiple principals and agents with their own priorities
can lead to severe goal misalignment in public sector work, including the education
policy context (Burgess and Ratto, 2003; Propper and Wilson, 2003; Goldhaber, 2007).
To align goals and minimize agency costs, education policy principals may wish to adopt
performance-based compensation policies that tie compensation to increases in student
achievement. For this recommendation to be valid, it will be necessary for policy
principals to reach consensus on measuring principal performance through student test
scores. Even in the climate of testing and accountability that has been established by No
Child Left Behind, the diverse stakeholders in public education will not easily arrive at
agreement that student test scores are a practical and appropriate way to monitor principal
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performance. At its very core, public education is perceived as being designed to serve a
variety of purposes, not simply educating students in academic fundamentals.
Policymakers who are interested in experimenting with incentive-based principal quality
reforms will likely need to compromise and may wish to allow for the use of a variety of
performance indicators in principal rating schemes. For example, rating strategies such as
peer reviews may provide evidence of principal effectiveness in meeting other perceived
goals of public education. Nonetheless, setting incentives tied to transparent, publicly
available performance measures can resolve monitoring difficulties inherent in principalagent relationships and can improve goal congruence by signaling clearly about policy
priorities (Ferris, 1992). Moreover, research shows that when designed properly and
implemented successfully (Lavy, 2007; Figlio and Kenney, 2006; Podgursky and
Springer; 2007), performance pay policies in education have the potential to raise student
achievement. However, policy principals (school boards) considering these pay reforms
should be aware of barriers to successful policy implementation.
One significant obstacle to successful implementation of performance-based pay
reforms is teacher, or agent, buy-in. Even if policy principals, such as school boards, are
able to agree upon using student achievement as measured on standardized tests as a way
to monitor performance, ultimately teachers and principals have to adopt the goal of
raising student achievement as their own priority (McDermott, 2004). Teachers must
also agree that measuring student achievement by standardized test scores is meaningful.
That is, in choosing incentives to motivate policy actors, policymakers also must keep in
mind how policy agents will respond to these incentives. One possibility is that educators
will see themselves as having to abandon their commitments to serving the needs of
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young people because the incentives created by policy principals do not align with
teachers’ concepts of their duties to attend to student needs (McDermott, 2004; Lipsky,
1980). As Lipsky (1980) suggested in his scholarship on street-level bureaucrats,
educators may object to measurement of performance by student test scores and view
these policy prescriptions and their superiors who support such prescriptions as
illegitimate. When this occurs, policies are undermined and not implemented as designed.
One way that policymakers can seek to get teacher and school principal buy-in to
support performance-based pay is to involve teachers and school principals in the design
of their merit pay plans (Heneman, Milanowski, and Kimball, 2007). Indeed, one
characteristic of well-conceived policy is that, though the original policy intents may be
addressed at a hierarchically super-ordinate level, the ultimate implementation decisions
are left to policy actors at the street level, who can develop an appropriate
implementation strategy that would best fit their local circumstances (DeLeon and
DeLeon, 2002). That is, even though state policymakers can mandate that localities
implement performance-based pay that involves measuring educator success by gains in
student achievement on standardized tests, policy principals may wish to include policy
agents in designing performance-based pay programs the local level.
This study has one primary recommendation and two positive potential outcomes
related to the recommendation. First, the original research in this study indicates that
principals are not meaningfully rewarded for superior performance, either through
explicit performance bonuses or though earning higher salaries by being hired in better
paying principalships. Variation in principal pay is driven by the size of the district and
school in which a principal works, the amount of wealth in a district, a principal’s
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experience, and a principal’s degree level. If policymakers would like to focus principal
attention on performance, rather than encouraging them simply to earn higher degrees or
to seek employment in districts with certain characteristics, policymakers should consider
instituting performance-based pay.
Second, evidence from research on the principal labor market in Texas indicates
that introducing performance rewards increases scrutiny of performance and can drive
changes in the composition of the principal workforce (Ladd, 1999). Perhaps as in Texas
the institution of performance awards in Arkansas by policymakers can improve their
monitoring abilities and might lead to a greater willingness on the part of school leaders
to make personnel changes when principals are shown to be low performing. As with
setting performance indicators, there will likely be political obstacles to introducing these
performance incentives both at the state and local levels. In particular, these new policies
may be difficult to implement because of the inherent controversy involved when
employment changes occur.
Recommendations for Researchers
As noted repeatedly above, very little research has been conducted on the features
of the school principal labor market. At the conclusion of his recent study on principal
compensation, teacher and principal compensation expert Dan Goldhaber (2007) noted:
… outside of a few high-profile examples, we have virtually no systemic
knowledge about the structure of principal compensation including the
extent to which compensation is linked to specific principal credentials or
characteristics, or covered by collective bargaining agreements; whether
principals are financially rewarded for taking tough leadership
assignments; and whether there is a link between their compensation and
measures of their performance. It should come as no surprise that a
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researcher is recommending more research on a topic, but, in this case,
the need is profound. (p. 15)

In addition to echoing Goldhaber’s (2007) call for more research on this topic, I would
refine his suggestion by calling for state-by-state research on principal labor markets,
principal performance pay, and principal compensation systems. Simply by contrasting
the findings from research on the Texas principal labor market to the Arkansas principal
labor market, the current study demonstrates that there are policy differences across
states. After researchers uncover these differences across states, they should begin to
explore whether these policy differences could be related to variation in student
performance.
Second, I would recommend that the exploration of the principal labor market in
Arkansas be extended to explore the role of deferred compensation, such as principal
pension plans, in its relation to principal turnover rates and patterns. Recently, Costrell
and McGee (2009) have shown that teacher retirement behavior in Arkansas is impacted
by the incentives that are created by the features of the teacher retirement system.
Retirement behaviors of principals in Arkansas should be explored with respect to
pension incentives particularly with reference to principal performance. Specifically, are
low performing principals being induced to stay on the job because of the structure of
their deferred compensation?
In conclusion, the original research in this study indicates that principals in
Arkansas are not meaningfully rewarded for superior performance, either through explicit
performance bonuses or though earning higher salaries by being hired in better paying
principalships. Variation in principal pay is driven by the district and school enrollment,
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the amount of wealth in a district, a principal’s experience, and a principal’s degree level.
If policymakers would like to focus principal attention on performance, rather than
encouraging them simply to earn higher degrees or to seek employment in large, wealthy
districts, policymakers should consider instituting performance-based pay.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Examples of Admission and Graduation Requirements for Principals
Basic Facts about Three Approved Administrator Licensure Preparation Programs (See
Appendix B for detailed course requirements by program)
University

Degree

Admission Requirements
1. Hold a valid teaching license
2. Minimum undergrad GPA of
3.00 (on a 4.00 scale)
3. Have two years of teaching
experience

Arkansas State

Master of Science
in Education
(MSE)

4. Have a written commitment
from a practicing building-level
administrator who will function
as your mentor during the
degree program/program of
study*

Graduation
Requirements
1. Completion of 36
hours in required
course of study.
Courses in Ethical
Leadership, School
Law, Supervision
and Evaluation of
Teaching, etc.
2. Completion of
Supervised
Internship in last
semester
3. Completion of
program portfolio

1. Completion of a bachelor’s
degree from an accredited
institution
2. Prior admission to the
University of Arkansas Graduate
School, involving a separate
application process
3. Submission of proof of a
currently valid teaching
certificate
U of A Fayetteville

Master of
Education in
Educational
Leadership (MEd)

4. A completed Educational
Leadership Program Application
for Admission Form
5. At least three supporting
letters of recommendation
6. An undergraduate cumulative
grade point average of 3.00 or
higher on a 4-point scale*

1. Completion of 33
hours in required
course of study.
Courses in School
Law, Analytical
Decision Making,
School Building
Finance, etc.
2. A cumulative
grade-point average
of at least 3.00 on all
course work is
required for the
degree. No grades
below “C” are
accepted for graduate
degree credit
3. Satisfactory
performance on a
written
comprehensive
examination or
portfolio presentation
4. Completion of
Internship
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1. A baccalaureate degree
from a regionally accredited
institution
2. A cumulative grade point
average of at least 2.75 (4.0
scale) or 3.0 in the last 60
hours
3. A valid teacher license

U of A Little Rock

Master of
Education (MEd)
in Educational
Administration and
Supervision

4. An autobiographical data
form
5. Two letters of reference
6. A recommendation of the
program advisor
7. Evidence of two years
teaching experience at a
level appropriate to the
individual’s program
emphasis. *

*conditional admission requirements exist for those not meeting these criteria)
http://education.astate.edu/ease/masters_edlead.htm; http://ualr.edu/edleadership/;
http://edle.uark.edu/4335.htm
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1. Completion
of 37 hours in
required course
of study.
Courses in
Education Law
and Ethics,
Supervision of
Learning
Services, School
Finance, etc.
2. Master’s
Degree Portfolio
presentation to
program faculty
and an outside
administrator/
practitioner.
3. Two
Semesters of
Administrative
Internship

Appendix B: Coursework required for administrator licensure by program

Arkansas State University

Master of Education Leadership (M.Ed.) Degree Course Requirements
http://education.astate.edu/ease/masters_edlead.htm
A. Foundation Courses
o ELFN 6773 Introduction to Statistics and Research
o ELFN 6763 Philosophies of Education
(These two foundation courses should be taken early in the program.)
B. Introductory/Prerequisite Course
o ELAD 6103 Ethical Leadership
(Action Research and the Portfolio are initiated in this course which also
serves as the prerequisite to all other ELCI/ELAD courses; this course can
be, however, taken concurrently with another ELCI or ELAD course.)
C. Educational Administration and Curriculum/Instruction Core Courses
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

ELAD 6073 School Law
ELAD 6003 School and Community Relations
ELAD 6033 Administration and Supervision of Special Education
ELAD 6053 Planning and Resource Allocation
ELCI 6533 Theories of Instruction
ELCI 6083 Supervision and Evaluation of Teaching
ELCI 6063 Curriculum Management

[One of the following curriculum courses; (ELCI 6063 is a prerequisite)]
o ELCI 6323 Elementary School Curriculum
o ELCI 6423 Middle School Curriculum
o ELCI 6523 Secondary School Curriculum
D. Internship
ELAD 6593 Supervised Internship
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University of Arkansas – Fayetteville
Master of Education (M.Ed.) Degree Course Requirements http://edle.uark.edu/1000.htm

A. Completion of the following required common courses in Educational Leadership
twenty-four (24) hours):
o EDLE 5013 School Organization and Administration
o EDLE 5023 The School Principalship
o EDLE 5043 Ethical Leadership
o EDLE 5053 School Law
o EDLE 5063 Instructional Leadership, Planning and Supervision
o EDLE 5083 Analytical Decision Making
o EDLE 5093 Effective Leadership for School Improvement
o EDLE 574V Internship (3 hours)

B. Completion of nine (9) credit hours from a common core of designated three-hour
courses required by the University of Arkansas College of Education and Health
Professions, including:
o EDLE 5033 Psychology of Learning
o EDLE 5073 Research for School Leaders
o EDFD 5013 Research Methods in Education or EDFD 5393 Applied
Educational Statistics
o EDFD 5303 Historical Foundations of Modern Education

University of Arkansas – Little Rock
Master of Education (M.Ed.) Educational Administration Degree Course Requirements
http://ualr.edu/med/EDAS/
A. Educational Foundations (6 hours)
o EDFN 7303
o Introduction to Educational Research EDFN 7370
B. Educational Assessment Building Level Internship (6 hours)
o EDAS 7380 Administrative Internship (First Semester)
o EDAS 7380 Administrative Internship (Second Semester)
C. Required Coursework Educational Administration (23 hours)
o EDAS 7209 Building Coalitions in School and Community
o EDAS 7300 Foundations of Educational Administration
o EDAS 7301 Administration and Assessment of Curricular Programs
o EDAS 7302 School Finance and Human Resource Allocation
135

EDAS 7303 Education Law and Ethics
EDAS 7304 Supervision of Learning Services
EDAS 7305 The Principalship
EDAS 7310 Facilitating School Improvement Counselor Education (2
hours)
o CNSL 7212 Effective Communication in the Educational Organization
o
o
o
o
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Appendix C: Complete Question 1 Tables for Subgroup Analyses
Appendix Table C.1: Complete Research Question One Regression Table for
Elementary School Principals
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $84,358; SD $12,305)
for Model 3 (M $84,416; SD $12,314)

Model 1
(No
Performance
Data)

Model 2
(AYP Data)

Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

Experience (years)

141.49**
(28.64)

142.87**
(28.62)

139.20**
(28.74)

Female

101.09
(522.02)

61.31
(521.95)

1.43
(525.07)

Principal Minority (non
white)

-1810.47*
(733.99)

-1767.32*
(733.64)

-1669.04*
(742.91)

BA
MA (Omitted)

-5900.41**
(2249.77)
-----

-5927.46**
(2247.66)
-----

-5971.00**
(2249.50)
-----

Specialist

2564.80**
(637.96)

2565.55**
(637.35)

2557.18**
(638.27)

Doctorate

6582.45**
(1322.98)

6662.97**
(1322.41)

6895.68**
(1338.32)

District Enrollment

.741**
(.06)

.74**
(.06)

.74**
(.06)

District _FRL%

-77.95*
(28.03)

-78.11*
(32.29)

-87.57**
(32.61)

District_Minority%

40.58
(30.21)

41.40
(30.19)

46.22
(30.45)

District_Wealth

62.11**
(14.60)

60.32**
(14.62)

58.35**
(14.68)

School Enrollment

13.34**
(1.47)

13.52**
(1.47)

13.01**
(.76)

School_FRL%

-25.60
(26.20)

-22.84
(26.21)

-9.12
(27.09)

School_Minority%
Year 2005-06

1.75
(27.12)
-----

6.16
(27.20)
-----

7.87
(27.53)
-----

3249.95**
(568.50)

3230.90**
(429.39)

2930.41**
(590.06)

Variable

Year 2006-07
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Year 2007-08

5823.03**
(577.52)

5812.64**
(577.00)

5236.24**
(629.64)

Meets_AYP

-----

1253.88
(666.85)

-----

Average % proficient time t-1

-----

-----

45.37*
(19.49)

68,774.88**
(1,917.19)
1341
0.522

67,459**
(2,039.11)
1341
0.523

65, 984**
(2,291.14)
1341
0.523

Intercept
N observations
R2
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Appendix Table C.2: Complete Research Question One Regression Table for
Middle School Principals
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $89,471; SD $12,678)
for Model 3 (M $89,510; SD $12,701)
Model 1
(No
Performance
Model 2
Data)
(AYP Data)

Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

63.63
(44.25)

59.22
(44.35)

57.45**
(0.19)

Female

-1175.89
(757.08)

-1098.13
(758.96)

-1391.62
(751.63)

Principal Minority (non white)

-176.83
(1424.54)

-163.93
(1423.61)

1009.78
(1444.80)

BA
MA (Omitted)

-4330.97
(2981.34)
-----

-4169.37
(2981.96)
-----

-3619.42**
(2954.22)
-----

Specialist

3655.95**
(865.37)

3666.28**
(864.82)

3995.10**
(864.41)

Doctorate

4575.63*
(1498.37)

4801.46**
(1507.53)

4664.68**
(1478.88)

.82**
(.10)

.83**
(.10)

.82**
(.10)

District _FRL%

-146.42
(84.81)

-150.03
(84.80)

-152.38**
(32.61)

District_Minority%

89.26
(82.68)

88.09
(82.63)

88.62
(81.82)

District_Wealth

11.42
(21.23)

10.33
(21.23)

.63
(21.27)

School Enrollment

18.12**
(2.10)

18.42**
(2.11)

17.18**
(2.11)

School_FRL%

75.35
(77.59)

-82.77
(77.75)

92.02
(76.65)

School_Minority%
Year 2005-06

-25.03
(80.41)
-----

-18.93
(80.50)
-----

7.12
(80.60)
-----

Year 2006-07

3552.13**
(882.06)

3577.12**
(881.68)

3202.10**
(895.36)

Year 2007-08

6903.50**
(884.76)

7011.42**
(888.10)

5677.85**
(975.76)

Meets_AYP

-----

1126.03
(871.48)

-----

Variable
Experience (years)

District Enrollment
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Average % proficient time t-1

Intercept
N observations
R2

-----

-----

68,774.88**
(1,917.19)
512
0.607

70,199.17**
(3,177.31)
512
0.609
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109.71**
(40.23)
65,
731.23**
(3,724.04)
508
0.620

Appendix Table C.3: Complete Research Question One Regression Table for High
School Principals
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $86,588; SD $14,349)

Variable

for Model 3 (M $86,470; SD $14,253)
Model 1
(No
Performance
Model 2
Data)
(AYP Data)

Model 3
(Percent
Proficient)

Experience (years)

267.80**
(43.67)

267.81
(43.70)

267.05**
(44.36)

Female

-1302.83
(1001.80)

-1305.78
(1003.90)

-1188.02
(1039.89)

Principal Minority (non white)

1959.29
(1597.54)

1966.72
(1607.32)

1704.91
(1680.49)

BA
MA (Omitted)

-4346.58
(2809.25)
-----

-4337.18
(2819.13)
-----

-4473.58
(2834.48)
-----

Specialist

1614.55
(1061.66)

1614.25
(1062.43)

1560.28
(1094.73)

Doctorate

4402.57
(2368.17)

4406.19
(2371.24)

3520.93
(2528.21)

.75**
(.13)

.75**
(.13)

.76**
(.13)

District _FRL%

-25.79
(79.22)

-25.49
(79.54)

-32.35
(82.46)

District_Minority%

-42.46
(91.61)

-42.73
(91.87)

-39.67
(96.36)

District_Wealth

-26.45
(21.48)

-26.47**
(21.50)

-25.27
(21.78)

School Enrollment

14.86**
(1.68)

14.86**
(1.38)

14.61**
(1.40)

School_FRL%

-21.22
(66.16)

-21.38
(66.31)

-54.61
(69.35)

School_Minority%
Year 2005-06

86.91
(87.35)
-----

87.58
(88.67)
-----

86.91
(92.74)
-----

Year 2006-07

3569.52**
(902.98)

3572.18**
(905.59)

3584.80**
(928.88)

Year 2007-08

6770.87**
(898.65)

677.04**
(900.60)

6670.35**
(932.69)

Meets_AYP

-----

50.97
(1142.54)

-----

District Enrollment
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Average % proficient time t-1

Intercept
N observations
R2

----70,653.55**
(2,543.02)
717
0.537
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-----

8.48
(34.34)

70,592.68** 69,819.54**
(2,887.65)
(3,266)
717
697
0.537
0.526
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